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Preface 
This is the third special report issued by the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy 
Group since it was reconstituted in 1999, coinciding with the launch of 
monetary union in the EU. It is ‘special’ in the sense that it does not focus 
on current developments in the European economy, as do our usual annual 
reports, but rather on the imbalances that have developed in the global 
economy. ‘Global imbalances’ is the polite term adopted by policy-makers 
to describe the huge current account deficit of the US, but the term also 
captures an important aspect of this phenomenon: the fact that the US 
would not have been able to build up such an extraordinary deficit if other 
countries had not been willing to run very large surpluses. We capture this 
dynamic with the expression: ‘It takes two to tango’.  
What is the role of Europe in this global game? On the one hand, one 
could argue that Europe, and in particular the eurozone, is an innocent 
bystander as its external account remains more or less balanced. On the 
other hand, Europe has contributed to a widening of the US current 
account deficit and it has a vital interest in a resolution of these imbalances 
without too many frictions. The main theme of our report then is: how long 
can the present constellation of external imbalances last and will their 
resolution affect Europe? 
We wish to acknowledge the valuable contribution of Selen Guerin, 
LUISS Research Fellow at CEPS. Funda Celikel provided excellent research 
assistance. All remaining errors are ours. Regular readers of the MPG 
reports will have noticed another feature that makes this report special, 
namely we have abandoned our traditional cover design of the green and 
purple-coloured blocks for an original drawing, for which we wish to thank 
our colleague Jorge Núñez Ferrer. 
The work of the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group would not have 
been possible without the continuing support of our main sponsor, 
Deutsche Bank, London, and Tudor Investments of Washington, D.C. I 
wish to thank them once again for their material and financial contributions.  
Daniel Gros 
Director 
April 2006 | 1 
 
 
Non-Technical Summary 
‘It takes two to tango’. The unprecedented US current account deficit 
would not have been possible without the willingness of other countries to 
run equally unprecedented surpluses. So far, the two partners have moved 
in near-perfect synchronisation, with US households increasing 
consumption at the same pace that emerging markets and, more recently, 
oil exporters, were increasing savings. The dance has now reached such a 
frantic tempo, however, that it is not likely to go on much longer without 
the lead partner becoming exhausted. A gradual winding down is still 
possible, and indeed is likely, as demand growth in the US slows and the 
supply of savings from the rest of the world diminishes with investment in 
emerging markets increasing and consumption in oil-exporting countries 
also rising to reflect their greater wealth. Nevertheless, the longer the dance 
goes on, the more likely it becomes that an accident will occur because of a 
lack of synchronisation between the two main partners.  
Serious problems for global financial markets could arise if one of the 
two dancers wants to continue and the other wants to quit.  
For example, emerging markets and oil exporters might continue to 
remain large net savers, but the US might have used up its credit with 
financial markets because its debt is judged to have reached an 
unsustainable level. In that case, the dollar would decline sharply and US 
interest rates would have to increase even further. Other central banks, 
including the European Central Bank, might have to step in to prevent the 
global economy from sliding into recession. We regard this scenario as 
conceivable but unlikely for the time being. 
But the opposite scenario also cannot be excluded: US policy-makers 
might want to continue to keep growth at its current pace, but emerging 
markets might no longer be willing to run large surpluses. In that case, 
financial markets would be buffeted by two opposing forces: faced with a 
slowing housing sector and an exhausted consumer, the Federal Reserve 2 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
might start lowering short rates again to maintain the pace of expansion 
but, in order to keep the global savings-investment balance, global long-
term real interest rates would have to increase sharply, bringing down 
asset prices until US consumption is brought in line with income. The 
willingness of the US authorities to accept a prolonged slowing of the US 
economy and thus avoid this scenario is likely to be tested soon. 
Another risk is that the lead partner becomes overly confident and 
believes he can do a solo performance. That some US politicians are 
susceptible to this temptation is evidenced by calls for protection of US 
assets from foreign take-over, even restrictions on the purchase of US 
Treasuries by foreigners are being mooted. If this were really implemented, 
however, the music would stop and many of the dancers would lose their 
footing and some might even collapse to the floor. | 3 
 
 
Executive Summary 
Over the last decade, the global economy has trod a dynamic path with 
ever-increasing US current account deficits financed by surpluses 
accumulated in emerging market economies. This report argues that this 
state of affairs has resulted from an exceptional and complex combination 
of events and policy responses that are unlikely to persist, requiring an 
adjustment soon in asset markets and the global economy. 
We argue that the global supply of savings is likely to shrink soon, 
with investment in emerging markets growing strongly and consumption 
in oil-rich countries adjusting gradually to the windfall from high oil prices. 
This combination should lead to higher real interest rates and a cooling of 
real estate markets, with asymmetric effects on the US economy which 
should slow much more than the eurozone. A gradual resorption of the US 
external deficit is thus possible without a crash of the US dollar.  
The key issue for this gradual adjustment is whether US policy-
makers will accept a prolonged period of weaker growth: a conditio sine qua 
non for a reduction in the US external deficit towards more sustainable 
levels is a reduction of the growth rate in domestic demand by about 1 
percentage point over several years. Since this lower US growth will likely 
drag down global growth, a cautious approach to the reduction of the US 
current account deficit is likely, with the adjustment taking place over a 
few business cycles. If, however, the process is unduly delayed by US 
policies resisting this necessary slowing down of domestic demand growth 
or by the rest of the world failing to pick up the baton, the odds of a 
disorderly adjustment will increase dramatically. 
The US current account deficit has now reached 7% of GDP, beyond 
all previous historical records, but the perceived importance of this 
phenomenon seems to be declining. In fact, the policy discussion has 
become highly politicised, with a different consensus emerging in each of 
the affected geographical areas as to the cause of the current situation:  4 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
•  the ‘Washington consensus’ blames China for under-consumption 
and a beggar-thy-neighbour exchange rate policy,  
•  the ‘European consensus’ blames the US fiscal deficit and the Fed’s 
loose monetary policy and 
•  the ‘Asian consensus’ blames the US for over-consumption and sees 
the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves as an integral 
component of a managed floating exchange rate system.  
One side effect of these conflicting views is a lack of any deep 
analysis of the problem, as most observers are motivated by a specific 
agenda.  
This report tries to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive 
discussion of the global imbalance. And this is badly needed, because, 
despite the apparent complacency, there is still a vague feeling among 
policy-makers that the situation is unsustainable and that the US dollar will 
eventually need to fall further. Given the appreciation of European 
currencies against the dollar in recent years – and concerns that this would 
overtax the adjustment capacity of European economies – G-7 policy-
makers have increasingly called on Asian countries, especially China, to 
allow their currencies to rise against the dollar. China’s first step – a move 
towards a managed floating basket that involved an initial appreciation of 
2.1% with respect to the US dollar – was encouraging, but this modest 
response despite the tremendous pressure exerted by US policy-makers 
shows how difficult it will be to achieve equilibrium only through price 
adjustment.  
In fact, we doubt that exchange rate changes will suffice to restore 
current account imbalances to more sustainable levels. In our view, these 
imbalances are more deeply rooted in changes in the demand and supply 
of international savings which, in turn, have triggered important policy 
decisions in industrialised and developing countries. Adjustment will 
therefore not only require exchange rate changes but also changes in real 
interest rates and, along with these, probably in asset prices. 
Specifically, we argue in this report that a rise in the international 
supply of savings from emerging market economies (EMEs) combined with 
a fall in investment in OECD countries pushed real interest rates to record 
lows. The deflation scare that emerged from the combination of the 
bursting of the stock market bubble, t h e  s h o c k s  t h a t  e n s u e d  f r o m  t h e  
corporate scandals and geopolitical events, combined with the entering of A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 5 
 
China and India into the world trading system, provoked in response a 
policy of aggressive lowering of nominal and real interest rates. An initial 
savings glut thus became a liquidity glut. While the fall in real interest rates 
was experienced in most OECD countries (and in particular in both the US 
and the eurozone), the impact on domestic demand was asymmetric and, 
consequently, current account imbalances rose. When the sustained 
increase in oil prices added to the savings-investment imbalance, current 
account imbalances reached historical highs. 
Can this process continue? It is apparent that the US current account 
deficit cannot go on increasing forever, but our analysis suggests that even 
the current level is unlikely to represent an equilibrium in the long run as 
consumption is likely to increase in the oil-rich countries and investment is 
already increasing in most emerging markets. Both these developments 
should, in the medium run, restrict the global supply of savings available to 
fund the US current account deficit. 
How does the story end? A few aspects seem clear.  
First, there is little appetite for policy action, although there is a clear 
menu of policies that each player should be undertaking for its own good – 
namely, fiscal adjustment in the US, accelerated structural reform in Europe 
and exchange rate appreciation in Asia – yet none shows signs of taking 
these actions.1  Thus, one should not expect any relief from the current 
constellation of policy-makers.  
Second, although the cyclical mechanisms of adjustment are well 
understood, it is unclear whether there will be enough time to let them play 
out in practice. However, a confidence crisis in the US economy which 
would suddenly dry up foreign financing, make the dollar tumble and 
interest rates rise, remains a theoretical possibility, but the market’s 
behaviour in recent years seems to suggest that it is highly unlikely.  
Therefore, the most likely scenario remains one where the standard 
business-cycle dynamics play out, albeit in a very slow fashion. With 
investment recovering in OECD countries, we believe it is only a matter of 
                                                      
1 In a similar fashion, the post-Katrina spike in oil prices in late 2005 generated a 
similar debate – and a similar non-response: in a world with very little spare 
capacity, higher oil taxes in the US and in Asia would be the obvious response to 
the demand/supply mismatch. 6 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
time before real and, ultimately, nominal rates rise. The rise in real rates – 
and the accompanying decline in asset prices – would in time rebalance 
domestic demand across regions and restore current account balances to 
more sustainable levels. This is likely to be the key adjustment mechanism, 
not changes in the bilateral euro/dollar exchange rate. If supervisors and 
regulators have ensured that the recent expansion in credit has been done 
under safe and sound criteria and there are no further shocks or policy 
mistakes, then the odds of a gradual and smooth adjustment are high.  
Clearly, the longer one delays making gradual adjustments in the real 
interest rate and asset prices, the higher is the risk that the unwinding of 
the imbalances will impart serious exchange rate and asset price shocks on 
the world economy. While such a disruptive adjustment scenario may 
appear not very likely in the near-term future, we regard it as ever more 
likely the longer the present imbalances persist.  
It is in this context that we ask ourselves whether the current 
framework for monetary policies around the globe is adequate. In a world 
with ever more integrated capital markets and global supply chains, the 
informational value of traditional domestic indicators of price pressures 
has declined significantly. Inflation is becoming a global phenomenon, and 
this raises the question of whether conducting monetary policy based on 
domestic Phillips curve considerations is still appropriate. We find a strong 
correlation between housing price inflation and current account deficits 
across developed countries, suggesting that, in the absence of wage 
inflation because of global labour arbitrage, overheating appears in the 
external accounts. Under this hypothesis, the US current account deficit 
and inflated housing markets could just be indications of an overheated 
economy, probably as a result of an overestimation of potential growth. 
Thus, it looks as if the global imbalance may not be a problem per se, but it 
could become one if it degenerates into excessive asset price inflation. A 
number of questions thus arise: Can a central bank consider its job done if it 
achieves internal balance at the expense of a large external imbalance? 
Should monetary policy be redefined as the achievement of financial 
stability in a way that encompasses internal and external balances, as well 
as asset price stability?  
The answers to these questions provide the key to defining what the 
appropriate policy response should be. If the current global imbalance is 
simply the result of a combination of external shocks, then all actors must 
contribute to its resolution – and the euro area should try to stimulate its A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 7 
 
domestic demand to share the burden of the adjustment with the US, rather 
than considering itself ‘in balance’. However, if the current global 
imbalance is a signal that the constellation of policies in the US is too loose, 
then the US should bear the brunt of the adjustment process – and the rest 
of the world should just admit that this US overheating has benefited them 
along the way rather than complain about the cost of the adjustment. We 
do not pretend that we have the answers to these questions at this stage. 
But by formulating these questions in a (hopefully) clear manner, we hope 
to improve the chance of finding the right answer when new facts emerge. 
 8 | 
 
 
Introduction 
As the US current account deficit has climbed beyond all previous 
historical records, concerns about the implications of this development and 
debates about possible remedies have intensified in academic and policy 
circles. Reference to the risks emanating from ‘global imbalances’ – which 
has become the politically correct synonym for the US current account 
deficit – has become a standard health warning accompanying most 
economic forecasts, and foreign exchange markets have repeatedly had the 
jitters. After a brief debate in late 2004, however, the excitement has waned: 
economic polices have barely changed and perceptions of the importance of 
the problem seem to be declining. In fact, the discussion has become largely 
politicised, with a different consensus emerging in each of the major 
economic areas of the world: the ‘Washington consensus’ blames China, the 
‘European consensus’ blames the US fiscal deficit and the Fed’s loose 
monetary policy, and the ‘Asian consensus’ sees the accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves as an integral component of their managed 
floating exchange rate system. One consequence of these conflicting 
interpretations is a lack of any deep systematic analysis of the problem, 
since a large majority of the studies undertaken are intended to champion a 
specific agenda.  
This report tries to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive 
discussion of the global imbalance. And this is badly needed, because, 
despite the apparent complacency, there is still a vague feeling among 
policy-makers that the situation is unsustainable and that the US dollar will 
eventually need to fall further. Given the appreciation of European 
currencies against the dollar in recent years – and concerns that this would 
overtax the adjustment capacity of European economies – policy-makers 
have increasingly called on Asian countries, especially China, to allow their 
currencies to rise against the dollar. China’s first step – a move towards a 
managed floating basket that involved an initial appreciation of 2.1% with 
respect to the US dollar – was encouraging, but its small size despite the A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 9 
 
tremendous pressure exerted by US policy-makers shows how difficult it 
will be to achieve equilibrium only through price adjustment. In fact, we 
doubt that exchange rate changes will suffice to restore current account 
imbalances to more sustainable levels. In our view, these imbalances are 
more deeply rooted in changes in the demand and supply of international 
savings which, in turn, have triggered important policy decisions in 
industrialised and developing countries. Adjustment will therefore not 
only require exchange rate changes but also changes in real interest rates 
and, along with these, probably in asset prices. 
Specifically, we argue in this report that a rise in the international 
supply of savings from emerging market economies (EMEs) in the late 
1990s combined with a fall in investment in OECD countries in the early 
years of this decade pushed real interest rates to record lows. The deflation 
scare that emerged from the combination of the bursting of the stock 
market bubble, the shocks that ensued from the corporate scandals and the 
geopolitical events, and the entering of China and India into the world 
trading system generated a policy response leading to policy interest rates 
declining sharply in line with real capital market rates for capital. An initial 
savings glut thus became a liquidity glut. While the fall in real interest rates 
was experienced in most OECD countries (and in particular in both the US 
and the eurozone), the impact on domestic demand was asymmetric and, 
consequently, current account imbalances rose. When the sustained 
increase in oil prices added to the savings-investment imbalance, current 
account imbalances reached historical highs. 
How does the story end? A few facts seem clear. First, there is little 
appetite for policy action, either at the domestic or the global level, 
although there is a clear menu of policy options that each player should be 
undertaking  for its own good – namely, fiscal adjustment in the US, 
accelerated structural reform in Europe and exchange rate appreciation in 
Asia. None of the players, however, is heeding this advice. In a similar 
fashion, the post-Katrina spike in oil prices in 2005 generated a similar 
debate – and a similar non-response: in a world with very little spare 
capacity, higher oil taxes in the US a n d  i n  A s i a  w o u l d  b e  t h e  o b v i o u s  
response to the demand/supply mismatch. Thus, one should not expect 
any relief from the current constellation of external imbalances by policy-
makers. Second, although the cyclical mechanisms of adjustment are well 
understood, it is unclear how they would play out in practice. A typical 
crisis scenario, whereby eroded confidence in the US economy dries up 10 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
foreign financing and makes the dollar tumble and interest rates rise, 
remains a theoretical possibility, but market behaviour in recent years 
seems to suggest that it is unlikely.  
Therefore, the most likely scenario remains one where the standard 
business cycle dynamics play out, in a very slow fashion. With investment 
recovering in OECD countries, we believe it is only a matter of time before 
real and nominal rates rise. The rise in real rates – and accompanying 
decline in asset prices – would in time rebalance domestic demand across 
regions and restore current account balances to more sustainable levels. 
This is likely to be the key adjustment mechanism, not changes in the 
bilateral euro/dollar exchange rate. If supervisors and regulators have 
ensured that the recent expansion in credit has been done under safe and 
sound criteria, and if there are no further shocks or policy mistakes, then 
the odds of a gradual and smooth adjustment are fair. Clearly, the longer 
gradual adjustments in the real interest rate and asset prices are delayed, 
the higher is the risk that the unwinding of the imbalances imparts serious 
exchange rate and asset price shocks on the world economy. While such a 
disruptive adjustment scenario may not appear very likely in the near-term, 
we regard it as ever more likely as the forecasting horizon increases.  
It is in this context that we ask ourselves whether the current 
framework for monetary policies around the globe is adequate. In a world 
with increasingly integrated capital markets and global supply chains, the 
information content of traditional domestic indicators of price pressures 
has declined significantly. The generation of inflation is becoming a global 
phenomenon, and this raises the question of whether conducting monetary 
policy based on domestic Phillips curve considerations is still appropriate. 
We find indeed a strong correlation between housing price inflation and 
current account deficits across developed countries, suggesting that, in the 
absence of wage inflation because of global labour arbitrage, overheating 
appears in asset prices and the external accounts. Under this hypothesis, 
the US current account deficit and inflated housing markets could simply 
be indications of an overheated economy, probably resulting from an 
overestimation of potential growth. If that is the case, the global imbalances 
may not pose a problem per se, but they need to be considered in the 
context of asset price changes and the role of monetary policy in connection 
with those changes. A number of questions thus arise: Can a central bank 
consider its job done if it achieves internal balance at the expense of a large 
external imbalance? Should monetary policy be redefined as the A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 11 
 
achievement of financial stability, in a way that encompasses internal and 
external balances, as well as asset price stability?  
The answers to these questions provide the key to defining what the 
appropriate policy response should be. If the current global imbalance is 
simply the result of a combination of external shocks, then all actors must 
contribute to its resolution – and the euro area should try to stimulate its 
domestic demand to share the burden of the adjustment with the US, rather 
than considering itself ‘in balance’. However, if the current global 
imbalance is a signal that the constellation of policies in the US is too loose, 
then the US should bear the brunt of the adjustment process – and the rest 
of the world should just admit that this overheating of the US economy has 
benefited them along the way rather than complain about the cost of the 
adjustment. We do not pretend that we have the answers to these questions 
at this stage. But by formulating these questions in a (hopefully) clear 
manner, we hope to improve the chance of finding the right answer when 
new facts emerge. 
We proceed first, in chapter 1, by analysing the US external deficit on 
its own, pointing to some anomalies in the official data that suggest that 
both the deficit and the net external debt of the US might be worse than 
reported in the official statistics. Chapter 2 then sets the US deficit in the 
context of the global financial system, finding that its counterpart has 
recently been concentrated primarily in oil-exporting countries. Chapter 3 
therefore explores briefly the reasons behind the increase in the price of oil 
and the future evolution of the demand-supply balance. Chapter 4 tries to 
fit the stylised facts of the major savings-investment imbalances that have 
developed over the last decade into the two main competing theories 
(labelled ‘savings glut’ and ‘liquidity glut’). Chapter 5 concludes. 
 12 | 
 
 
1.  Is the US external position  
sustainable? 
The single most eye-catching imbalance in the world economy today is the 
US current account deficit. Its counterparts are more or less sizeable current 
account surpluses in a number of other countries and regions. Given the 
unequal distribution of the imbalances, any analysis of this phenomenon 
must therefore start with a critical look at developments in the US current 
account. In this chapter we look at the US deficit from a purely national 
point of view, with a particular emphasis on the question whether there is 
any reason to expect a sudden loss of confidence in the US economy that 
might lead to crisis. We start with a brief description of how the deficit 
arose in the first place. We then discuss two sets of arguments that go in 
opposite directions. The first one focuses on the assertion that the US deficit 
is less important and actually smaller than suggested at first sight. The 
second argument focuses on two anomalies in the US external accounts that 
suggest that the official statistics actually do not properly track the huge 
external debt the US has accumulated so far. We conclude that markets are 
likely for the time being to focus on the first set of arguments, thus making 
the US situation sustainable. If markets were to focus on the anomalies in 
the official accounts, however, the stage could be set for a confidence crisis. 
Nevertheless, the probability of a balance-of-payments crisis developing in 
the US remains low, not least because of the large weight of the US in the 
world and the dominance of the US dollar in financial markets: there is 
simply nowhere capital could flee if investors lost confidence in the US.  
1.1  How it came about 
Over the last few years, the US current account deficit has gone from record 
to record, reaching close to 7% of GDP in 2005 (with the US merchandise 
trade deficit hitting a record high of $726 billion in that year, up 60% from 
2001). Figure 1.1 shows that the external deficit has been trend wise A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 13 
 
increasing on any measure one could take (current account, net exports of 
goods and services or net real exports). Seen from a domestic, US point of 
view, the reasons for this widening gap are multiple, but can be 
summarised in one key point: domestic demand has increased on average 
each year by about half a percentage point more than output. What were 
the drivers behind this gap? 
Since 2001, there has been a simultaneous increase in investment – as 
business spending on plant and equipment recovered from the recession 
and housing investment expanded further – and decline in national savings 
– as the sharp deterioration of the fiscal balance and the further decline in 
personal savings more than offset the improvement in corporate savings 
stemming from the restoration of corporate balance sheets. We show below 
that if looks back further than 2001, the decline in savings has been far 
more important than the increase in investment. 
More recently, the income account has  started to deteriorate, as 
expected, as the servicing of the huge net foreign liability position starts to 
weigh on the current account. We argue below that the magnitude of both 
debt service and the accumulated debt are probably significantly under-
recorded. It is thus likely that, if properly measured, the current account 
deficit has actually deteriorated even further than officially recorded 
Figure 1.1 The US external balance: Down by any measure 
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The role of the dollar exchange rate in this process of ever-increasing 
deficits seems to have been limited. In a first phase, from the mid-1990s to 
about 2000, the dollar appreciated along with an increasing deficit. As 
concerns about the size of the deficit increased, the US dollar then declined 
by about 15% from its peak in trade-weighted terms, but then recuperated 
part of the terrain lost in 2005, as US companies repatriated profits to take 
Box 1. Predicting the US current account 
The US current account deficit has widened almost every year since the early 
1990s. The year-to-year increase in the deficit increases was somewhat 
irregular, but usually less than 1% of GDP. The level reached now, over 6% of 
GDP for 2005, thus came about after a long, gradual process. A priori one would 
expect that such a long drawn-out process should be predictable, but this seems 
not to have been the case, at least if one looks at the forecasts of the IMF. Over 
the last seven years for which year-ahead projections of the World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) are available (1999-2005), the IMF has continuously predicted 
that the US deficit would be constant, whereas in reality it deteriorated each 
year, on average by close to $75 billion (0.7% of GDP) over this period.  
Table 1.1 The US current account balance: Actual and forecast 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Actual  data  (1)  -214 -300 -416 -389 -475 -520 -668 -759 
Forecast as of autumn of 
previous year (2)    -228 -308 -461 -446 -452 -583 -510 
Forecast error  
(3) = (2) - (1)    -72  -108 71 -29 -68 -85 -249 
Difference between forecast and 
actual data for forecast year 
(4) = (2) – (1)t-1    -14  -8 -45 -56  23 -63 158 
Difference in actual deficit 
(5) = (1) – (1)t-1    -86 -116  27  -86  -44 -148  -91 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, autumn 2005 forecast. 
It is interesting to note that the IMF made similar systematic forecast 
errors for the eurozone. But while the forecast error for the eurozone was of a 
similar size, it came about in a different way. For the eurozone, the IMF 
predicted almost continuously a substantial improvement in the current 
account (on average $50 billion), whereas in reality the eurozone’s current 
account did not change much over this period. As a proportion of GDP, the 
forecast error for the eurozone was also close to 0.7% of GDP. A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 15 
 
advantage of the Homeland Investment Act and as negative political news 
in Europe and Japan reduced the appeal of those currencies. The overall 
result of these ups and downs is that the US real effective exchange rate 
( b a s e d  o n  u n i t  l a b o u r  c o s t s )  h a s  a p preciated only by a little  (below 5%) 
between 1997 and 2005. This implies that it is difficult to argue that 
exchange rate movements have been a major factor behind the massive US 
deficit. Developments since 2000 are particularly difficult to reconcile with 
the view that the deficit is due to an overly strong dollar given that the US 
dollar has depreciated considerably in recent years on any basis one might 
take, but the US external deficit has continued to widen.  
Partly for this reason, it is often argued that the US deficit is due to a 
growth deficit in the rest of the world. This argument is flawed, both on 
theoretical and empirical grounds. If the higher US growth rate were the 
result of a positive supply shock, one would expect that exports would 
increase – even at a constant or rising real exchange rate – along with the 
increase in the potential output. But this has not been the case: over the last 
decade, exports from the euro area have increased as much as exports from 
the US. Secondly, while it is true that growth in the eurozone and Japan has 
been disappointing, this has been more than compensated for by higher 
growth in emerging markets. Hence, it is not the case that the difference 
between US and world output growth has increased over the last decade. If 
one compares the ten years leading up to 1995 with the following decade, 
one finds that world output growth has actually increased slightly more 
than US growth (the US growth rate increased by 0.46 percentage points 
whereas world output growth – using PPP weights –  increased by 0.53 
percentage points).  
It is thus not easy to explain the continuing widening of the US 
external deficit with the two main conventional factors: the exchange rate 
and relative growth rates. We will argue below that a key factor might have 
been that US policy-makers are overestimating the potential growth rate 
and are thus pushing demand above its potential, thus creating the gap 
between  what the US produces and what it invests and consumes.  This 
overestimation of the potential growth rate has apparently been shared by 
the international financial institutions, which explains why the continuous 
increase in the deficit was not anticipated, as analysed in Box 1. 
The large increase in the deficit during 2005 does not necessarily 
imply that the process is accelerating. Timid signals of global rebalancing 
are becoming visible when one looks at the data more carefully. The 16 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
deterioration in 2005 is due to a large extent to higher oil prices, and in fact 
the trade gap only increased marginally in real terms. In addition, growth 
in the eurozone and in Japan is starting to accelerate, as the impact of loose 
monetary polices is starting to be felt in those areas as well. Circumstances 
might thus be ripe for a reversal of the trend increase in the US deficit, but 
this evidently requires that domestic demand growth is restrained for some 
time. As we show below, whether or not this is the appropriate course of 
action depends crucially on how one interprets recent changes in global 
financial flows. 
1.2  The role of offshoring 
An important element of this rebalancing process is offshoring. We argued 
in Gros et al. (2004) that, once intra-company transactions are taken into 
account – that is, adopting an ownership definition of the current account – 
the US current account deficit would be reduced by about 1% of GDP. In 
addition, arguing that this portion of the current account deficit is less 
worrisome from the viewpoint of sustainability – why would a parent 
company default on its affiliate? – we concluded that, although funding 
remained a challenge, sustainability was less of a problem. 
In a clear sign of globalisation at work, the correlation of exports and 
imports has increased dramatically, reaching over 90% since 2000 – 
compared to a long-run average of barely 50%. Pressing this argument 
further, it is interesting to notice that a portion of the US trade deficit is a 
necessary condition for sustained productivity growth. The argument is as 
follows: foreign affiliates typically follow two different strategies: market 
expansion or efficiency enhancement. Market expansion strategies typically 
have a positive effect on the current account, for the products 
manufactured abroad are usually sold in third-country markets. In addition, 
the higher profits represent a positive income flow for the current account. 
Thus, the net impact of this strategy is an improvement in the US current 
account.  
Efficiency-enhancement strategies, however, have a very different 
impact. The home country exports parts to the host country, which 
manufactures the final product for sale worldwide – including in the home 
country. Thus, exporting parts and then importing final products 
(containing those parts) – that is, offshoring – leads to a deterioration in the 
current account. If the offshoring consists of services, instead of goods, then 
the export component is basically zero and thus the deterioration of the A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 17 
 
current account is larger. But crucially, this offshoring process is at the 
heart of the expansion of productivity growth, as companies seek lower-
cost production centres, thereby freeing resources for higher value-added 
activities. 
This strategy has two basic implications: first, this part of the deficit is 
key to sustaining high productivity growth, and it could be seen as 
desirable deficit; second, this part of the deficit is expected to expand in the 
future, going beyond manufacturing. For example, McKinsey (2003) 
estimates that the US business of IT and business processing offshoring in 
India will grow exponentially over the next few years reinforcing this 
process. 
Figure 1.2 illustrates that there has been indeed a rather close 
correlation between US productivity developments and the current account 
deficit.  The mid-1990s show a clear acceleration of productivity, which 
temporarily is decoupled from the current account, but over recent years 
the relationship is again rather tight.  
Figure 1.2 US productivity and the current account 
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We return to this point later, when we argue that the absence of a 
hard external financing constraint has allowed the US to artificially boost 18 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
its potential growth rate by moving resources from more mature sectors 
producing tradable goods to more dynamic sectors producing non-tradable 
goods and services. As we shall then see, this approach to raising 
productivity growth becomes unsustainable when the external financing 
constraint eventually kicks in. 
 
Box 2. The impact of offshoring on the current account: An example 
Let us assume that a PC sells in the US for $1,000. Let us examine what this 
transaction would look like from an accounting and an economics standpoint. 
From an accounting perspective, the transaction looks as follows: 
The screen, built in Taiwan, costs $400. The margin of the Taiwanese 
manufacturer is $40. The box, built in China, costs $150, with a margin of $10. 
The Intel chip (designed in the US but made by a Taiwanese company) costs 
$100 with a margin of $60 going back to Intel and $10 going to the Taiwanese 
company. The software costs $275, with a margin of $200. The profit for the US 
PC manufacturer is $75. Profits for the US economy are $75 + $200 + $60 = $335. 
The profits for foreign economies are $40 + $10 (Taiwan) + $10 (China) = 
$60. Difference: + $265 for US companies. This is thus the essence of the business 
deal: US consumers get cheaper PCs and US companies capture most of the 
profits. 
From an economics standpoint, however, the transaction looks as follows: 
Imports: $925 (price of the PC minus the mark-up); 
Exports: $275 (the software); Trade deficit= $640. 
Increase in GDP, due to US companies’ profits = $335.  
Net loss for the US economy; $640 - $335 = -$305. 
Thus, from an economics standpoint, what is profitable for US companies 
increases the external imbalance of the economy. 
Why this apparent contradiction? Because US companies work with 
higher margins than foreign companies and they retain the higher value-added 
portion of the manufacturing process. Thus, if we were to compute the US trade 
balance with profits rather than with sales, the US would show a solid profit 
surplus.  
 A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 19 
 
1.3  Why sustainability might not be a problem: The role of net 
investment income and the currency composition of US assets 
and liabilities 
A critical moment in the global imbalance discussion will be when the net 
interest income on the US net foreign asset position turns negative since 
this would signal a self-reinforcing deterioration of the US deficit. In the 
second half of 1998, the US net interest income was already negative, but 
the US dollar rally that ensued in the wake of the launching of the euro and 
the sharp decline in interest rates that followed the bursting of the stock 
market bubble led to a positive balance again, offsetting the impact of the 
ever-widening trade deficit. However, as interest rates increase and, more 
importantly, as the interest rate differential widens, the net income account 
should slowly turn negative and put additional pressure on the current 
account balance. When this happens, worries about the sustainability of the 
US position are likely to resurface strongly, as this negative balance will be 
a stark reminder of the explosive nature of the 25% of GDP net foreign 
liability position. In short, the higher US interest rates go, the worse the 
current account dynamics will become.  
A critical feature of the US income account is that the US holds a net 
short US dollar position, whereby USD depreciation generates a positive 
wealth effect for the US. It is well known that the US has a net foreign 
liability position that is large and increasing. But it is less well known – 
although perhaps even more important – that the size of the gross positions 
has ballooned in recent years. US gross foreign assets rose from 30% of 
GDP in the early 1980s to over 70% in 2003, while US foreign liabilities 
skyrocketed from 22% to 95% of GDP, giving the 25% net foreign liability 
position.  
In contrast to emerging market countries, however, developed 
countries typically hold foreign assets denominated in foreign currency 
and foreign liabilities denominated in domestic currency. In this case, 
currency depreciation increases the value of their foreign assets, thus 
generating a positive wealth effect. This short position on its own currency 
is a very convenient cyclical hedge, for currencies typically move in synch 
with economic developments – applying similar logic, the IMF has been 
recommending countries to issue debt indexed on their own GDP growth.  
Estimates of this impact vary, but a good approximation is that a 10% 
USD depreciation improves the US net investment position by about 5% of 
GDP (Lane & Milesi-Ferreti, 2005, and Gourinchas & Rey, 2005). As cross-20 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
border investment activity continues, this effect will become even more 
important. If the US benefits from this wealth effect, who suffers from it? 
The counterpart of the US net USD short position is held by the Asian 
public sector and the European corporate sector, both of which are 
arguably overweight in US dollars – the Asian public sector through the 
perhaps excessive accumulation of reserves, and the European corporate 
sector as a result of the M&A frenzy of the late 1990s. Given that the 
n e g a t i v e  w e a l t h  e f f e c t  i n  A s i a  i s  a b s o r b e d  b y  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  w i t h  n o  
marked impact on the real economy, it is fair to conclude that the European 
economy is financing part of the US adjustment through lower profits and 
– probably – lower investment and job creation.  
These unrealised capital gains also alter the view about the 
sustainability of the US current account position. The key to understanding 
the evolution of the income account is that, over the past 25 years, the rates 
of return on foreign assets owned by US residents and the rates paid on US 
debt owned by foreigners have been roughly equal for portfolio and 
banking investments. In contrast, the US return on foreign direct 
investment has on average been 6 percentage points higher than other 
countries' return on their direct investments in the US, while the return on 
US official investment has on average been 4 percentage points lower than 
official foreign investment in the US.  In addition, the share of FDI and 
equity investment in US foreign assets is larger than that in foreign 
liabilities, and thus the US seems to have been taking higher risk in its 
foreign investments (see Lane & Milesi Ferretti, 2005). This explains why 
the United States has been able to maintain a net income surplus over the 
last 25 years, despite growing as a net debtor over this period.  
Kouparsitas (2005) argues that assuming that the rates of return of the 
past 25 years will persist, the US could stabilise its current net foreign debt 
position by running a current account deficit of 1.3% of GDP. This estimate 
is still well below the current deficit, but there is an important caveat to 
note. The headline current account figures reported by the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) come from the national income accounts and 
they only include realised returns on foreign assets, while the BEA’s 
foreign asset and foreign debt stock estimates reported in its annual net 
international investment position (IIP) take into account the unrealised 
capital gains from both changes in local currency prices and exchange rate 
adjustments. Given the net short USD position that the US holds, this is a 
key factor. Kouparsitas (2005) argues that the net effect of these price A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 21 
 
revaluations in 2003 raised the value of the net US IIP by 3.2% of GDP. If 
these unrealised gains were to be included as an item in the foreign income 
account, net US IIP would have been roughly 3.5% of GDP and the US 
current account deficit for 2003 would have been just 1.7% of GDP, roughly 
in line with the level that stabilises the external position. Corroborating this 
estimate, the actual change in the net IIP-to-GDP ratio was a decrease of 0.8 
percentage points in 2003, well below the 4.8 percentage points implied by 
the current account as conventionally reported. 
The common underlying theme of these considerations is that the 
imbalance could be less pronounced than the headline current account 
deficit suggests. However, it is important to understand that the wealth 
effect deriving from the USD depreciation is contingent on a constant USD 
decline – that is, for the US to be able to stabilise its external situation 
without adjustments to domestic demand, the USD needs to depreciate 
steadily in real effective terms so that the positive wealth effect offsets the 
deterioration of the debt-servicing needs. But should we trust the official 
data on which the above arguments are based? Probably not. 
1.4  Why it may be worse than the official data suggest 
The view that the US can run large deficits without accumulating an 
unsustainable external debt is based on the official statistics for the current 
account and the US international investment position. Closer examination 
of both reveals, however, a huge anomaly. 
Over the last two decades, US residents have sold a total of around 
$5.5 trillion (thousand billion) worth net of IOUs to foreigners, whereas the 
officially recorded net investment position of the US has deteriorated only 
by a little over one half of this amount ($2.8 trillion) over the same period. 
The US capital market seems to have worked like a black hole for investors 
from the rest of world in which $2.7 trillion have vanished from sight – or 
at least from the official statistics.  
How can $2.7 trillion disappear? 
As argued above, it could be simply that the US makes large capital 
gains on its gross positions, because its assets are in foreign currency and 
its liabilities denominated in USD. However, the available data indicate 
that over the last two decades this factor netted the US at most $300-400 
billion. This leaves a loss of over $2 trillion to be explained. The 
‘explanation’ comes in two tranches of about $1 trillion each:  22 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
i)  Very large residual, ‘other’, or rather unexplained, changes recorded 
by the BEA in its statistics on the net US international investment 
position (IIP), which have averaged a similar order of magnitude. 
ii)  An anomaly in the accounting item, ‘reinvested earnings’ in the 
balance of payments, which improves the US current account by 
about $50-$100 billon per annum because foreign firms report 
systematically very low profits for their US-owned operations. 
These two phenomena, which must be kept separate, are explained below. 
a)  The US as a black hole for foreign investment 
We start with the second phenomenon, which consists basically of a huge 
stock-flow discrepancy. The stock, i.e. the net US IIP, should in principle be 
equal to the sum of past flows, i.e. current account balances (mostly 
deficits). However, this is by far not the case. Between 1982 and 2004, the 
US has accumulated a grand total of around $4.5 trillion of current account 
deficits. But its net international debtor position had deteriorated during 
the period ‘only’ by $2.7 billion (estimated at ‘only’ around $2.5 trillion as 
of end-2004). This implies a total of ‘unearned’ gains to the US of around 
$1.8 trillion during 22 years. Taking into account the balancing item ‘errors 
and omission’ does not significantly affect this conclusion since this item 
has summed to less than $250 billion over this period, thus leaving a hole of 
close to $1.6 trillion. 
What can explain the approximately $1.6 trillion in vanishing deficits? 
The short answer is that this difference cannot be explained. It is as if the 
US capital market was a black hole: inflows disappear without leaving a 
trace. For a more detailed description of how this happens, it is necessary to 
restrict attention to a somewhat shorter period, for which more detailed 
data are available, namely 1989-2004. Over this 15 years period, the US 
cumulated current account deficits totalling $3.7 trillion, but its net IIP 
deteriorated only by about $2.5 billion. The lost capital thus amounts 
‘only‘ to about $1.2 trillion since 1989. Given the lack of detailed data for 
the period between 1982 and 1989 (the first period of large current account 
deficits), all one can say is that the US cumulated current account deficits of 
around $700 billion, but its net IIP (according to today’s data) deteriorated 
only by $100 billion, leaving around $600 billion of unexplained gains.  
These discrepancies are much larger than what one can observe for 
other countries. For example, Japan has accumulated current account 
surpluses worth around $2 trillion and its official net international A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 23 
 
investment position is very close to this amount. Gros (2006b) provides 
more detail for other countries as well as for the US. 
Could the gain for the US be due to the fact that the US gains from a 
depreciation of the USD because most of its assets are in USD, but a large 
part of its liabilities are in foreign currency? Table 1.2 in Box 3 shows that 
this has not been the case. Over the period for which detailed data are 
available, exchange rate gains have totalled only around $220 billion. This 
is not surprising given that by end 2004, the US dollar was not far from the 
value it had already reached during the early 1990s.  
Could the US have benefited from differential movements in stock 
markets? This is also unlikely a priori as over the long run the US stock 
market has not performed worse than its foreign counterparts. The table in 
Box 3 shows that indeed the sum of the net capital gains and losses over 
this time period was only around $120 million.  
These two results imply that, even taking into account gains from 
capital revaluation, one cannot explain why the discrepancy between the 
cumulated current account deficit and the present net IIP of the US is so 
large. The table in Box 3 shows that over the last 15 years the sum of those 
changes in the US IIP that cannot be explained either by stock markets or 
by exchange rate changes is equal to close to $1.1 trillion. 
What could be the reason for this discrepancy? The key to 
understanding the discrepancy (or the size of the item ‘other changes’) lies 
in the fact that the data on financial flows come from a completely different 
source than that on the net international investment position (IIP). The 
latter is essentially based on surveys organised by a number of institutions. 
The most important survey is the one that tries to measure foreign portfolio 
investment, i.e. US securities held by foreigners, which is done by the New 
York Federal Reserve. The size of foreign portfolio investment in the US is 
thus estimated on the basis of reports from US-based custodians, who are 
asked to detail the securities they hold on behalf of foreign owners. By 
contrast, the data on financial flows are based on the reports of brokers 
when they sell securities to foreigners. A share of a US company held by a 
European would thus not appear in the US IIP if the share is not held with 
a US-based custodian. But the purchase of the share would have been 
recorded in the balance of payments as a flow in the year the purchase took 
place.  
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Box 3. The US as black hole for foreign savings 
The best (and only) background source for the stock-flow discrepancy is a 
recent tabulation by the BEA that shows the main sources of changes in the net 
US IIP (see below Table 1.2). The second column of this table shows for each 
year the financial flows that ‘balance’ the current account (minus errors and 
omissions, whose sum over this period was negligible). The last entry in this 
column shows the cumulated financial flows, or the cumulated current account 
deficits, whose sum amounts to $3.744 trillion over these 15 years. The last 
column in this table shows the net US IIP position at the end of each year. 
Comparing the beginning 1989 to the end 2004 value shows that the 
deterioration has been $2.553 trillion, approximately $1.2 trillion less than the 
sum of the current accounts. The explanation (or rather the lack thereof) lies in 
the columns (b)-(d). 
Table 1.2 Components of changes in the net international investment position with 
direct investment at market value, 1989-2004 ($ billions) 
Changes in position 
Attributable to 
Valuation adjustments 
Financial 
flows  Price 
changes 
Exchange rate 
changes1 
Other 
changes2 
Total   Year 
Position 
beginning 
(a) (b)  (c)  (d)  (a+b+c+d) 
Position 
ending 
1989 10  -50  7  -15  0  -57  -47 
1990 -47  -60  -149  57  34  -118  -164 
1991 -164  -46  -96  5  41  -96  -261 
1992 -261  -96  -76  -75  55  -191  -452 
1993 -452  -81  293  -22  119  308  -144 
1994 -144  -127  23  73  40  9  -135 
1995 -135  -86  -152  39  29  -171  -306 
1996 -306  -138  84  -66  65  -54  -360 
1997 -360  -221  -92  -208  58  -463  -823 
1998 -823  -70  -288  68  41  -248  -1,071 
1999 -1,071  -236  330  -126  66  33  -1,037 
2000 -1,037  -486  134  -271  80  -544  -1,581 
2001 -1,581  -400  -224  -152  18  -758  -2,339 
2002 -2,339  -500  -60  231  213  -116  -2,455 
2003 -2,455  -561  -2  416  230  83  -2,372 
2004 -2,372  -585  147  272  -4  -170  -2,542 
  Sum totals  -3,744  -121  227  1,086  -2,553   
 
1 Represents gains or losses on foreign-currency-denominated assets and liabilities due to their revaluation 
at current exchange rates. 
2  Includes changes in coverage, capital gains and losses of direct investment affiliates, and other 
adjustments to the value of assets and value of assets and liabilities. 
Source: www.bea.gov. Data are consistent with those published in “The International Investment Position 
of the United States at Year End 2004”, Survey of Current Business, July 2005.  A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 25 
 
 
 
Measuring the value of foreign ownership of US real estate is even 
more difficult (unless it is held for business purposes). The balance of 
payments would record the acquisition, but the surveys used for the IIP 
would have no way of accounting for it. It is thus apparent that the surveys 
will tend over time to miss part of foreign-owned assets in the US. 
However, as the BEA takes the surveys as the only reliable source for the 
US net IIP, it is forced to introduce the item ‘other adjustments’ in order to 
reconcile the data on the IIP with those from the balance of payments.  
b)  Foreign direct investment in the US: Being taking to the cleaners? 
As mentioned above, a number of observers have noted two peculiarities of 
the US balance of payments: the first is that the US continues to report 
small positive net income flows although it has accumulated a huge foreign 
debt. The second is that the US, despite its undoubtedly large net foreign 
debt, is still reported to have a substantial net creditor position in terms of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). What is less widely appreciated is that 
these two anomalies are due to one, crucial item in the US balance of 
payments, namely reinvested (or retained) earnings (earnings minus 
repatriated dividends). On closer inspection, the flows reported for this 
item reveal an idiosyncrasy that suggests that it might be grossly 
mismeasured, thus distorting the published figures for both the US current 
account and its international investment position – the latter to the tune of a 
trillion dollars. Contrary to other contributors, we start from the hypothesis 
that it is unlikely that investors from all over the world would continue to 
Box 3, continued 
Column c contains the exchange rate effect (most assets are in USD, but a large 
part of liabilities are in foreign currency). The last entry in column (c) in Table 
1.2 shows that since 1989 the net gain from exchange rate changes for the US IIP 
has been only a bit over $220 billion. 
Differential movements in stock markets seem also not to have been a major 
factor. The last entry in column (b) confirms that this is indeed not the case as 
the effect of the sum of the capital gains and losses over this time period has 
been to reduce the US net IIP by around $120 million.  
The last entry i n  c o l u m n  ( d )  s h o w s  t h a t  o v e r  t h i s  p e r i o d  t h e  s u m  o f  t h o s e  
changes in the US IIP that cannot be explained either by stock markets or by 
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pour hundreds of billions of dollars into FDI in the US if they had really 
been constantly taken to the cleaners.  
The official data on reinvested earnings reported in the US balance of 
payments2  cannot be taken at face value. This much is suggested by a 
simple comparison between the reinvested earnings reported on US direct 
investment abroad and those reported by foreign direct investment in the 
US – see Table 1.3 in Box 4. The former, i.e. what US firms report for their 
investment abroad, has amounted to over $1,100 billion over the last 20 
years (1982-2004). The latter, i.e. what foreign firms report for their 
investment in the US, has amounted to less than $20 billion over the same 
period (on average less than $1 billion per annum)! It is difficult to accept 
this difference at face value, particularly since there is little difference in 
terms of distributed earnings between US FDI abroad and foreign FDI in 
the US and given that there is little difference in the reported returns on 
portfolio equity investment. 
The purpose of establishing a balance of payments (BoP) for a 
country is to show how different kinds of payment flows balance, i.e. how 
inflows and outflows offset each other. Traditionally a balance of payments 
recorded just the payments made for the acquisition of goods and services 
or capital. Reinvested earnings were added relatively recently as a pure 
accounting entry to the balance of payments, although they do not 
represent a real flow of payments. They were added to reconcile the 
balance of payments data with the statistics on the international investment 
position, which is not immediately related to the flows of payments in the 
traditional balance of payments concept. 
                                                      
2  The US data of course are also used in the statistics issued by international 
financial institutions (IFIs), such as the IMF. A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 27 
   
Box 4. Being taken to the cleaners? 
The fact that the official US current account does not show any substantial 
deficit under income flows has attracted a lot of attention. The US income 
account has not moved into deficit basically because the net return on FDI has 
been positive and increasing, thus offsetting the increasing net payments on 
bonds, on which the US has a very large debtor position. However, it has never 
been noted that most of the positive net income from FDI results from the huge 
difference in reported retained earnings. Table 1.3 below summarises the 
relevant gross flows. This table uses the average over longer periods because 
income flows tend to be variable from year to year. The table shows that more 
than one-half of the reported (gross) income from US direct investment abroad 
consists of retained earnings. By contrast, the (gross) income paid to the parents 
of firms with direct investment in the US consists almost entirely of distributed 
earnings.  
On average over the last six years, the US has reported a net income from 
FDI of about $120 billion per annum.1 Almost $100 billion p.a. of this is due to 
the difference in reported reinvested earnings and only about $25 billion to the 
difference in distributed earnings.  
Table 1.3 Income on US direct investment abroad: Annual averages, 1999-2004 
($ billions) 
 Total  reported 
profits (a) 
Distributed 
earnings (b) 
Reinvested 
earnings 
(c)=(a)-(b) 
From US direct investment abroad  158.4  54.9  103.4 
From FDI in the US  -38.9  -32.0  -6.9 
Net  US  income  119.5 22.9 96.5 
Source: BEA. 
Eliminating retained earnings from the US current account would thus 
reduce the surplus of the US on direct investment income by almost $100 billion 
per annum (from $119.5 to $22.9 billion, thereby still leaving a small surplus). 
Given the deficit on portfolio investment, this implies that the US is in reality 
already now running a substantial deficit on the income account equivalent to 
almost 1% of US GDP.2 For further analysis, see Gros (2006c). 
 
1 In 2005, this increased to $128 billion, but the precise split between retained earnings 
and dividend payments is not available yet for this year. 
2 As shown in more detail in BEA (2005), a switch between reinvested earnings to 
repatriated dividends (as occurred apparently during 2005) would also have other 
second-order implications for the current account, mainly through withholding taxes. 
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Inserting the item ‘reinvested earnings’ into the balance of payments 
does not change the fact that the balance of payments always adds up to 
zero because reinvested earnings are entered twice and with opposite sign: 
for the foreign assets owned by home residents, reinvested earnings 
increase the income account part of the current account and then enter the 
capital account with a negative sign as an increase in direct investment 
abroad (and vice versa for foreign-owned direct investment at home). 
Reinvested earnings thus do not lead to any increase in errors and 
omissions, but they can change the way the balance looks: higher 
reinvested earnings make the current account look better and, over time, 
increase the value of direct investment abroad. 
The fact that reinvested earnings represent a pure accounting entry 
has a key implication for how the data are collected. Since reinvested 
earnings do not correspond to a payment flow, they cannot be collected in 
the way almost all other entries in the balance of payments are collected, 
namely to rely on data from cross-border payment flows. Instead, in the 
regular surveys used to establish the US international investment position, 
US firms are asked to report the profits of their foreign affiliates. The 
replies are then combined with information on repatriated profits (actual 
payments of dividends, etc.) to calculate reinvested earnings, which are 
defined as profits minus repatriations. The latter correspond to financial 
flows that actually take place and can thus be cross-checked. But the former 
represent just the numbers reported by US parents of foreign enterprises. 
Higher reported profits abroad do not engender any additional tax liability 
(US tax is deferred until repatriation).  
The same procedure also applies to US affiliates of foreign firms: they 
are also asked to report their profits. However, in this case the replies can 
be cross-checked with the profits declared by these firms, which are usually 
incorporated in the US. This difference in the meaning of the profits 
declared for BoP purposes suggests the reason why the US affiliates of 
foreign firms regularly declare rather low profits: to minimise their US tax 
liabilities. 
Reporting profits to the US authorities has thus different tax 
implications for foreign direct investment in the US than for US direct 
investment abroad. A further indication that declared retained earnings are 
strongly influenced by fiscal and regulatory considerations is that during 
2005, retained earnings reported by US firms on their foreign direct 
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period of 2004. 3   The changes in US tax regulations regarding the 
repatriation of profits earned abroad that were in force during 2005 thus 
had an immediate and strong impact.  
These huge swings in the data should already constitute a reason not 
to rely on the accounting data used as the basis for official statistics. But 
there are also several other reasons for adopting a rather strong 
presumption that the rate of return on foreign direct in investment in the 
US should not be too different from the average return of US corporations 
(which in turn has not been too different from the longer-run averages of 
dollar returns on major stock markets around the world). 
The first reason derives from a simple comparison between FDI and 
portfolio investment. The official data imply that foreigners instantly start 
losing (compared to their US counterparts abroad) when they invest more 
than 10% into a US company. This conclusion seems unavoidable given 
that the rate of return on US portfolio assets has been the same as the rate 
on US portfolio liabilities (foreign investment in the US). Direct investment 
is any transaction under which a foreigner acquires more than 10% of the 
capital of an enterprise. It seems that foreign investors in the US are able to 
obtain a market rate of return (which can be objectively measured) if they 
own less than 10% of a US company. But the official statistics (based on 
accounting data) imply that their returns are much lower once the 
investment qualifies as direct, i.e. once it goes above the 10% threshold. 
The second reason is that it is difficult to imagine that foreign 
investors would go to the trouble of making a direct investment in the US 
when there are much better profit opportunities at home. Apparently these 
opportunities have been exploited by US corporations, which report much 
higher profit rates. This would not only be a gross violation of the general 
assumption of market efficiency, but also of the general assumption that 
consistent profit opportunities will in the long run be exploited. 
Finally, if the official statistics were correct, foreigners would accept a 
rate of return on their direct investment in the US of only around 2.5%, 
                                                      
3 Before 2004, this item had mostly fluctuated around this order of magnitude. As 
will become clearer below, the much lower figure reported for reinvested earnings 
for 2005 has as its accounting counterpart lower reported FDI abroad for that year. 
But a difference in a flow of around $120 billion will not have a measurable impact 
on the reported stock of US FDI, which is at present more than 20 times larger. 30 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
which would be much lower not only of that on their US portfolio equity 
investment, but also lower than the 5.5% return earned on debt instruments. 
The official data based on accounting returns would thus imply a strongly 
negative equity risk premium (for FDI alone!).  
Box 5. Transfer pricing 
H o w  c o u l d  t h e  o w n e r s  o f  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t h e  U S  r e d u c e  t h e i r  
reported profits and thus minimise their US tax liabilities? The bulk of foreign 
direct investment in the US concerns large corporations and leads to 100% 
foreign ownership.1 The foreign owner can thus shift profits easily in and out of 
the US. The key consideration about where to generate profits will thus be 
taxation. Since the US corporate income tax rate is higher than in most other 
countries, it follows that most owners of direct investment in the US have an 
incentive to shift profits from the US subsidiary level to the mother company or, 
even better, a holding company located in a tax haven.  
One obvious means of shifting profits is via transfer pricing. By charging 
the US subsidiary a high price for goods and services delivered by the foreign 
mother company, profits could be easily shifted out of the US.  
If transfer pricing had been the main reason for the low reported rates of 
return on foreign direct investment in the US, one would have to observe that 
reported export prices decline relative to import prices2 – and the magnitude of 
this mis-measurement of the terms of trade would have to be large. As shown in 
more detail below, the profits declared by foreign direct investors in the US are 
on average around $120 billion (annually) lower than one would expect if they 
earned a normal profit rate on their investment in the US. Given that US exports 
are worth about $1,100 billion, this implies that the US terms of trade should be 
distorted by transfer pricing by 10-11%. If transfer pricing had an important 
impact on measured profits, one should thus observe a trend deterioration of the 
US terms of trade over the last few decades of about 10%. However, this does 
not seem to have been the case. The US terms of trade have fluctuated around a 
constant value over the last 20 years (in line with fluctuations in the oil prices) 
without any discernible long-term trend, a s  s h o w n  i n  m o r e  d e t a i l  i n  G r o s  
(2006c). 
 
1 This implies that for most of the FDI that actually takes place, the 10% threshold is not 
material. The US internal revenue service (IRS) treats foreign-controlled companies 
differently from domestic companies. Foreign-controlled is defined by the IRS as foreign 
ownership of 50% or more. 
2 For a given level of FDI transfer pricing to shift profits out of the US, the terms of trade 
might be constant, but the volume of FDI has been constantly increasing in recent 
decades – implying that a growing part of the US economy might be subject to this 
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Transfer pricing could be one explanation, but as Box 5 shows, this 
does not seem to be the case in reality. If transfer pricing had been the main 
reason for the low reported rates of return on foreign direct investment in 
the US, one would have to observe that the US terms of trade should be 
understated by around 10-11% (because foreign owners of FDI in the US 
supposedly sell their subsidiaries’ inputs at inflated prices and get the 
output at artificially low prices). 
In calculating the US balance of payments, it might thus be better to 
ignore the large surplus on retained earnings (e.g. by ignoring this item on 
both US direct investment abroad and on foreign direct investment in the 
US). If this is done, the US current account deficit worsens by $120 billion. 
Making this adjustment also for past years leads to the conclusion that the 
net US international investment position is at least $1 trillion worse than 
commonly believed. 
In this section we have discussed two glaring anomalies in the US 
external accounts. Most other observers have taken the headline data at 
face value and marvelled at how the US was able to earn much more on its 
foreign assets than it pays out on its liabilities. We would argue that one 
should take the headline data with at least two very large grains of salt: 
i)  The net US debtor position (IIP) is based on survey data that do not 
fit the data on financial flows. As the data on financial flows mirror 
quite closely the data for real trade transactions, we would argue that 
it is more likely that the survey data are wrong because they miss 
foreign assets held in the US, thus under-reporting the net debtor 
position of the US. 
ii)  It is unlikely that foreign investors would continue to invest 
hundreds of billions of dollars in the US if they really earned only the 
minuscule returns they report to the authorities. Hence, the US 
current account deficit is likely to be even larger than officially 
reported.  
D o e s  i t  m a t t e r  t h a t  t h e  t r u e  U S  e x t e r n a l  p o s i t i o n  i s  p r o b a b l y  e v e n  
weaker than officially reported? The answer is that this depends on the 
perception of the US by financial markets. As long as the US is perceived as 
a strong and dynamic economy, the market is likely to view the official 
statistics as proof of the superiority of the US. The specific instances of 
m a r k e t  r e a c t i o n s  t o  n e g a t i v e  n e w s  s h o w  t h a t  t h i s  v i e w  s o  f a r  i s  s t i l l  
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1.5  Market reactions: How likely is a sudden drop of the US dollar? 
Market behaviour regarding the global imbalance has been confusing, to 
say the least. Foreign exchange markets are famous for not being able to 
focus on more than one issue at a time, and thus their attention shifts 
constantly. After the focus in 2004 – probably induced by the US election 
cycle – on the US current account deficit, triggered largely by discussions 
during the IMF Annual Meetings and leading to the sharp decline in the 
USD, markets stabilised around the turn of 2005, after the new US 
administration reversed policy and announced a new focus on fiscal 
consolidation. At that point, current account deficit considerations became 
secondary, and markets have been reacting to cyclical divergences, such as 
growth and interest rate differentials. Thus, despite the argument advanced 
above about the negative relationship between interest rate spreads and 
current account deficits, markets have been assuming that a faster path of 
interest rate hikes by the Fed would be positive for the USD. Since then, the 
USD has appreciated steadily, on the back of a better cyclical outlook and a 
widening interest rate differential. Going into the summer of 2005, the 
political uncertainty in Europe regarding the referenda on the European 
Constitution became the focus of markets, and the USD returned to its role 
as the main, and perhaps only, world reserve currency. If the euro were to 
disintegrate, as some European politicians seemed to be suggesting, this 
would be a good reason for the USD rallying further against the euro. Thus, 
markets seem to have ‘forgotten’ the extent of the US current account 
deficit and started to focus on cyclical and political developments as the 
main driver of currency moves.  
This complacent view of the smooth adjustment has often been 
challenged by a number of papers arguing for an imminent dollar crash – 
see, for example, Summers (2004). Several structural features, including the 
higher import elasticity and the higher level of imports as compared to 
exports, suggest that, unless there is a significant change in relative 
domestic demand growth and/or relative prices, the US current account 
deficit will expand indefinitely and thus the odds of a dollar crash are very 
high.  
A missing element in these crisis scenarios, however, is a discussion 
of what the likely dynamics of the crash would be. What would be the 
trigger that could lead to such a crash? An interesting case study is the 
downgrading of General Motors’ debt in April 2005. One of the typical 
scenarios advanced to justify the odds of a crisis is that there could be a A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 33 
 
sudden drop of confidence in the US asset markets that could lead to a 
capital outflow from the US and a sharp decline in the USD. In this vein, 
the downgrade of General Motors in April of 2005, one of the icons of US 
industry, could have been an example of the type of event that could lead 
to a confidence crisis in the US economy. It is thus interesting to study the 
market reaction to that announcement.  
The reaction was broadly as expected, with one very important 
caveat: the weight of the US economy in current economic growth is so 
large, or at least is perceived as being so large, that markets reacted in a 
correlated fashion, as if this shock was a shock to the global economy, not 
to the US market. Thus, world stock markets collapsed, world bond 
markets rallied, risk aversion increased – and therefore corporate bond and 
emerging market spreads widened. The reaction of the USD was very 
interesting: it sold off against the euro and the Swiss franc – the currencies 
perceived as alternative store of value – but it rallied against emerging 
market currencies. It was thus a typical flight to quality where the US bond 
market – and the USD broadly defined – was perceived as a ‘quality’ 
market, despite the fact that one of its iconic companies was being 
downgraded. Since the first downgrade, another ensued: Ford Motor, 
another of the Big Three American auto companies, was also downgraded. 
The market reaction was similar to the first instance – compounded this 
time by increased stress in the credit derivatives market – i.e. a generalised 
increase in risk aversion and flight to quality.  
Thus, a crisis scenario built on the ‘sudden loss of confidence’ trigger 
is, so far, difficult to validate given the market’s reaction to events that 
would have been a good excuse to sell the dollar. The key to this behaviour 
is the fact that the global economy is so interconnected and US growth is 
such an important component of global economic growth, that doubts 
about the health of the US economy lead rapidly to doubts about the 
sustainability of global growth. An alternative scenario that has not yet 
been tested would be an inflation scare. Given the highly-leveraged nature 
of the US consumer and the strong pace of housing market inflation, an 
inflation scare that led to a sudden spike in long-term interest rates would 
raise doubts about the sustainability of the US economy. Nevertheless, the 
question remains: what would be the reaction of markets faced with this 
scenario? Probably, after a brief spike in long-term interest rates, fears of a 
collapse of the US consumer would lead to an inversion of the curve as 
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process would start again – probably in a synchronised fashion. Given the 
different elasticities, a global recession could perhaps help to reduce the 
imbalance in the US external accounts, as imports would decline much 
more sharply than exports. Changes in demand growth differentials, rather 
than exchange rate movements, could thus in the end be the main drivers 
of adjustment. 
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2.  Changes in Global Financial Markets 
and the US Current Account Deficit 
From the discussion in Chapter 1, we may conclude that recent 
developments in the US current account, however we look at them, are 
unsustainable. But before jumping to the conclusion that the brunt of the 
adjustment must be borne by the exchange rate, as many analyses do, it is 
important to understand the underlying causes of these imbalances. We 
take a look in what follows at the genesis of the problem. 
2.1  Booms and busts in emerging markets as the primary driver 
behind increased world savings 
Equity markets were booming in the mid-1990s all over the world on the 
back of expectations of intensifying globalisation and a revolution in 
‘information and communications technologies’. At the same time, 
emerging markets were becoming popular destinations for international 
investors, particularly as their markets were opening up and offering high-
growth potential and attractive rates of return. But the boom experienced in 
emerging markets came to an abrupt halt in 1997, as a combination of lax 
fiscal policies, rigid exchange rates and rapid growth in consumption and 
investment led to widening current account deficits financed by large 
short-term capital inflows. Indeed, outside of Asia and Eastern Europe, 
foreign direct investment constituted a small share of the financing of the 
current account deficits. These were the classic ingredients that provoked 
the crises that occurred between 1997 and 2002. 
The history of crises in emerging markets in the late 1990s and early 
2000s is well documented and we won’t dwell on it here. Our interest is in 
the adjustment in current account and fiscal balances that followed the 
crises and its implications for the world real interest rate and for global 
savings and investment balances. Shut out of international capital markets, 
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governments, emerging markets began adopting sound economic policies: 
fixed exchange rates were abandoned, current account deficits turned into 
surpluses, large primary budget surpluses were generated, short-term 
external debt was eliminated and the depleted stock of international 
reserves was replenished to record levels. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the cumulated current account position of 
East European, Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries.4 From 
a cumulated deficit of $75 billion in 1995, emerging markets turned their 
current accounts into a sizeable surplus of $83 billion in 1999, as fiscal and 
monetary policy tightening improved public and private savings-
investment balances. Since 1999, competitive currencies and high 
commodity prices allowed emerging markets to generate even larger 
current account surpluses, reaching $367 billion in 2004. In 2004, the current 
account surplus among emerging markets’ oil producers reached more 
than $150 billion – or nearly half of the total emerging markets’ current 
account surplus. 
Figure 2.1 Emerging markets’ current account position ($ billions) 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2005. 
                                                      
4 The group of emerging market countries was built from IMF country groupings. 
Current account aggregates were computed by adding the current account 
balances in USD of these groups. The savings and investment ratios of our group 
of emerging markets was calculated as the weighted average of the IMF country 
groups on the basis of purchasing power GDP weights given by the IMF. The 
source of all data is the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database from September 
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Figure 2.2 Regional contributions to emerging markets’ current account balances 
($ billions) 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2005. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows for the same group of countries gross national 
savings and investment relative to GDP (the difference between the two 
series indicates the group’s external balance and thus its net export of 
savings). As crises in emerging markets unfolded in the second half of the 
1990s, emerging markets slashed their investment spending sharply. In 
1998, national savings also fell, as a number of countries plunged into 
severe recession. Thereafter, however, savings recovered on the back of 
domestic austerity policies, while investment followed only with a lag and 
at a more moderate pace. As of 1999, in a major change from past 
behaviour and against conventional wisdom of development economics, 
emerging markets began exporting large and growing amounts of savings 
to the rest of the world. In more recent years, exports of savings from 
emerging markets were boosted further by rising commodity prices. 
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Figure 2.3 Emerging markets’ national savings and investment positions 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2005. 
 
2.2  G-3: After the boom also the investment bust 
While emerging market countries experienced balance-of-payment crises 
and stabilisation recessions in the second half of the 1990s, industrialised 
countries enjoyed an economic boom on the back of surging stock markets 
and euphoria about the benefits of new information and communications 
technologies. In 2000, however, the boom turned into a bust as the 
valuation of ‘new economy’ equities climbed to irrational highs. In the 
event, the equity markets decline triggered a sharp drop in investment, as 
companies struggled to repair their balance sheets by paying down debt, 
and industrialised economies fell into stagnation or recession. 
Throughout the second half of the 1990s, industrialised countries had 
been net importers of international savings, reflecting a rise in investment 
on the back of the new technology boom that had not been matched by a 
corresponding rise in domestic savings. After 2000, however, investment in 
industrialised countries fell, just at the time when emerging market 
countries stepped up their export of savings (Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4 Emerging markets’ savings and industrialised countries’ investment 
positions (% of GDP) 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2005. 
At the beginning of the new millennium, global capital markets 
therefore were suddenly confronted with a rising supply of savings from 
emerging markets and falling demand for these savings from industrialised 
countries, which were experiencing an investment recession. There was 
only one way to equilibrate the global supply of and demand for savings: 
global real interest rates had to fall (which then depressed industrialised 
countries’ savings). This is illustrated in Figure 2.5, which shows the 
developments of the ratio of world investment-to-GDP and real US 10-year 
government bond yields, which we use here (somewhat loosely) as a proxy 
for global real interest rates.5 The drop in investment (relative to GDP) in 
the industrialised countries (shown in Figure 2.4) pushed down the global 
investment ratio (as the rise in emerging markets’ investment was too weak 
to compensate for the investment weakness elsewhere). As the investment 
ratio fell, real interest rates fell. As we argue in more detail below, the 
decline in real interest rates eventually helped turn around the decline in 
investment.  
                                                      
5 To calculate real interest rates, we simply deflated nominal US bond yields with 
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Figure 2.5 Global investment and real interest rates 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2005. 
2.3  Effects on current account balances 
A fall in global real interest rates was required to equilibrate the global 
market for savings and enforce the ex-post identity of real savings and 
investment. What was required was a new term structure of interest rates 
at a lower level, an exercise that involves the adjustment of both market 
and policy interest rates in a number of important markets, where 
exchange rate expectations interact with individual interest rate 
adjustments. Since interest rate response functions of policy institutions as 
well as financial market and economic structures differ across countries, the 
adjustment process evolves with trial and error, occurs at different speeds 
in different markets and is occasionally accompanied by considerable 
market volatility. A full description of this process with all details is 
impossible here. What is possible, however, is an analysis of a few key 
adjustment mechanisms and a discussion of the main implications of the 
interest rate adjustment. 
Given their control over the short end of the yield curve, central 
banks played a key role in bringing real rates lower. Their reaction was 
prompted by the perceived shortfall of investment and excess supply of 
savings that threatened the economic outlook and raised the spectre of 
deflation. As central banks experienced these imbalances to different 
degrees at different points in time, and as their response functions differed, A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 41 
 
they adjusted interest rates by different magnitudes and speeds. 
Nevertheless, their main achievement was to stabilise inflation against the 
backdrop of the described changes in global savings and investment. As a 
result, nominal long-term rates fully reflected the fall in real rates, as shown 
for the US in Figure 2.6. 
Figure 2.6 Nominal and real interest rates and inflation in the US 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2005. 
As discussed earlier, the decline in real rates was needed to balance 
the global demand and supply of savings. While the demand for savings by 
investors responds directly to changes in real interest rates, real and 
financial assets are the key channel of transmission for real interest rate 
changes to affect the supply of savings by private households in the 
industrialised countries.6 With the decline in real interest rates raising asset 
prices, consumers felt wealthier and were inclined to reduce their savings.  
The speed and magnitude of this link between asset prices and 
consumption are key determinants of the divergent reactions of domestic 
                                                      
6   To illustrate this point, consider the following standard investment and 
consumption functions: (1) I = I(r); (2) C = C(Y,W(r)). Equation (1) relates 
investment to the real interest rate and equation (2) relates consumption to income 
and wealth, which itself is a function of the real interest rate (with a decrease in r 
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demand to the global decline in real interest rates. Real estate markets 
played the most important role here given that housing still represents the 
most important asset for most families. Figure 2.7 shows how, in countries 
where housing prices increased strongly, real private consumption also 
grew strongly. Clearly, while the decline in real interest rates was a global 
phenomenon, demand and supply conditions in specific real estate markets 
mattered.7 For instance, housing prices fell in Japan and Germany, where a 
supply overhang existed. Moreover, there are large regional differences 
even within countries. This applies a fortiori to the US, whose average value 
results from a property boom on both coasts, while prices seem to have 
moved relatively little in the centre of the country. Even in those European 
countries (much smaller than the US) where on average housing prices did 
not increase greatly, there were localised booms, with all the attendant 
wealth effects. In addition to the differential direct wealth effect of 
diverging housing price appreciation, differences in the equity extraction 
mechanisms across countries played an important role. In countries where 
refinancing is easy and not expensive, like in the US, or where mortgages 
are mainly at variable rates, like in the UK or Spain, the consumption boost 
from the appreciation of housing prices was magnified, exacerbating the 
external imbalance.  
Figure 2.7 Housing prices (3rd qtr 2003) and real private consumption (2003) in 
16 OECD countries 
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7 See Gros (2006a) for a more detailed description of housing price developments in 
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Box 6. Spending on housing and the US current account  
There can be no doubt that housing must have an important impact on 
household expenditure. One channel is via general consumption expenditure, 
which should be strongly affected given that two-thirds of households own the 
home they live in. Moreover, as a rule of thumb, families invest often 6-7 times 
their annual income in housing. This implies that a movement of housing prices 
of 10% can have a very strong i m p a c t  o n  a c t u a l  o r  p e r c e i v e d  w e a l t h .  A n  
increase or a fall in housing prices, of say 10%, could thus be equivalent to a 
gain or loss of more than one-half of annual income, with a correspondingly 
strong impact on demand for the cash-constrained part of the population.  
It is not possible to isolate precisely the part of overall consumption 
expenditure that is due to housing wealth extraction, and expectations of future 
price appreciation might be as important as the level of house prices. A good 
indicator of how optimistic households feel about the prospects might be the 
level of residential investment. The figure below shows that there is indeed a 
strong correlation between residential investment (as a percentage of GDP) and 
the current account (again as a percentage of GDP). This close correlation 
constitutes another way to illustrate the likely link between the state of the US 
real estate market and the US current deficit.  
Figure 2.8 US residential investment and the external deficit 
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Fiscal policy also played an important role in restoring equilibrium in 
the global savings market. In particular, the US government turned from a 
net saver to a large dis-saver, absorbing a considerable amount of global 
savings and helping to stabilise domestic demand in the US. Other 
countries either had less room for fiscal policy manoeuvre or adopted a 
fiscal policy approach targeted to the long run, rather than to cyclical 
developments (this was largely the case in the euro area; see Gros et al., 
2005), and were hence also less successful in redirecting savings (that were 
no longer needed to finance investment) to consumption. Countries with a 
lacklustre real estate market and little room for fiscal policy action had the 
largest adjustment difficulties. Germany and Japan are prime examples. 
Through these mechanisms, national savings were eventually 
reduced in industrialised countries, allowing the latter to absorb the 
surplus savings of emerging markets at a time of lower investment activity, 
without triggering a major world recession. This was indeed an 
extraordinary achievement. However, as we argued above (and as Tables 
2.1 and 2.2 below show), changes in national savings and investment were 
uneven across countries or country groupings, leaving the world with 
considerable international current account imbalances. 
In sum, the stabilisation of the world economy at a time of huge 
changes in global savings and investment flows was accomplished through 
a large decline in real interest rates, which generated unpredecented 
current account imbalances. 
As shown in Table 2.1, US gross national savings as a share of GDP 
fell sharply from its 1995-97 average to 2005, while investment remained 
broadly stable (thanks to the rebound in 2004 and 2005). The sharp fall in 
real interest rates, combined with an expansionary fiscal policy, contributed 
to these developments. As a result, the recession of 2001 remained short 
and shallow, but the national savings-investment deficit increased 
considerably (see Figure 2.9). Developments in the UK and Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs) were similar to those in the US 
(though of smaller magnitudes). In contrast, in Japan and the eurozone, the 
drop in national savings fell short of, or just compensated for, the drop in 
investment. Since consumption did not compensate for the fall in 
investment, growth in these regions trailed that of the US, the UK and 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
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Table 2.1 Changes in savings and investment ratios as a % of GDP (2005 relative 
to 1995-97) 
  Savings  Investment  Change 
       
US  -3.00  0.67  -3.67 
Japan  -3.07  -4.37  1.30 
Euro area  -0.37  -0.50  0.13 
UK  -1.30  0.33  -1.63 
CEECs  -0.37  0.13  -0.50 
Emerging markets  4.80  -1.59  6.39 
CIS  7.67  -2.67  10.33 
Middle East  15.70  -1.70  17.40 
Western hemisphere  2.43  -0.93  3.37 
Asian NICs   -1.50  -7.00  5.50 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. 
 
Figure 2.9 US savings-investment balances as a % of GDP 
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Source: DB Global Markets Research. 
In most emerging markets (with the exception of the Asian newly 
industrialising countries, or NICs), national savings rose significantly 
between 1995-97 and 2005, while investment rose only little or fell. In the 
NICs, however, the savings-investment balance rose significantly because 
of the large decline in investment. As we argued above, this reflected in 
large part a change in economic policies aimed at reducing dependence on 
capital imports by creating a savings-investment surplus. In some regions, 46 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
notably in the Middle East and the former Soviet republics forming the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an improvement in terms of 
trade on the back of rising commodity prices added to the savings surplus.  
In contrast to Japan and the eurozone, however, emerging markets 
managed to grow fast during these years as a result of strong export 
growth to the US and the EU. Many of these countries prevented their 
exchange rates from appreciating against the US dollar and hence fully 
benefited from rising US import demand. With private sector capital flows 
militating against an external savings surplus, countries had to intervene in 
the foreign exchange markets, occasionally on a large scale, to stabilise their 
exchange rates. Through this exchange rate policy, they effectively taxed 
consumption and subsidised exports, and turned their savings surplus into 
a rise in official foreign exchange reserves. 
Table 2.2 shows changes in current accounts corresponding to 
changes in savings and investment balances. The current account position 
of emerging market countries improved by almost $450 billion between 
1995-97 and 2005, while the current account position of the other 
countries/regions listed in the table deteriorated by some $700 billion. 
Within the latter group, the current account position of Japan rose while 
that of the euro area deteriorated. Thus, increases in the current account 
surpluses of emerging markets and Japan financed to a large degree the 
increase in the current account deficits of other countries.  
Table 2.2 Changes in current account balances, 2005 and 1995-97 ($ billions) 
  2005  1995-1997  Change 
US  -759.018  -126.49  -632.52 
Japan  153.101  91.23  61.87 
Euro area  23.7  73.47  -49.77 
UK  -53.854  -8.90  -44.95 
CEECs  -56.4  -15.43  -40.97 
Emerging markets  370.2  -77.2  447.4 
CIS  105.3  -2.03  107.33 
Middle East  217.6  8.23  209.37 
Western hemisphere  21.3  -47.93  69.23 
Asian NICs   78  2.03  75.97 
Developing Asia  109.7  -24.10  133.80 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. 
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Table 2.3 Current account balances and changes in real effective exchange rates, 
2005 vs. 1995-97   
Current account balances ($ billions) 
  2005 
Average 
1995-97  Change 
Change in real 
effective exchange 
rate  
US  -759  -126  -633  4.5 
Japan  153  91  62  -27.5 
Euro area  24  73  -50  -6.6 
UK  -54  -9  -45  19.3 
CEECs*  -56  -15  -41  5.2 
Emerging markets*  370  -77  447  -2.9 
CIS  105  -2  107   
Middle East  218  8  209   
Western hemisphere  21  -48  69   
Asian NICs   78  2  76   
Developing Asia 
      Of which: China 
110 
116 
-24 
14 
134 
101 
 
2.8 
* Change in real effective exchange rates for CEECs and emerging markets use the 
difference between the years 2004 and the average of 1995-97. 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, International Financial Statistics and Direction of Trade 
Databases, December 2005.   
 
It is apparent from the last column of Table 2.3 that it is difficult to 
attribute to exchange rate movements the massive shifts in current account 
balances that have taken place over the last decade. The two entities with 
the largest shifts in their external balance, the US and the group called 
‘emerging markets’, experienced only marginal changes in their real 
effective exchange rates, an appreciation of slightly under 5% for the US 
and an even smaller depreciation for emerging markets. The same applies 
also to the case of China, whose importance in providing a counterpart to 
the US deficit is often overrated (as the table shows, China’s surplus 
increased ‘only’ by $100 billion against a deterioration for the US of over 
$600 billion). It experienced only a marginal change in its real effective 
exchange rate, which appreciated marginally over this period. 
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Box 7. Savings-investment = current account? 
The attentive reader will have noticed an inconsistency between Tables 2.1 and 
2.2. Table 2.1 reports that the deterioration in the US savings-investment 
balance amounted to ‘only’ 3.7% of GDP whereas Table 2.2 shows that the US 
current account deteriorated over the same period by over $600 billion, which 
as a percent of US GDP is closer to 5% than to 3.7%. In principle, the current 
account should be equal to the difference between (national) investment and 
savings (as assumed in Figure 2.9). However, this conceptual identity does not 
hold for the US. There is unfortunately an inconsistency between the US data 
for the savings-investment balance and the current account. The two tend to go 
together, over the medium run, but annual changes can differ considerably as 
shown in the scatter plot below, which shows the annual change in the savings-
investment balance and the change in the current account for the last decade 
according to the official data (as reported by the IMF in its World Economic 
Outlook). It is apparent that the correlation is rather weak. The regression result 
from the trend line shown in the chart suggests that changes in the savings-
investment balance variable can only explain less than one-quarter of the 
variation in current account changes (and the coefficient on the savings 
investment balance is only 0.35, far from the value of 1, which one would 
expect). 
Figure 2.10 Changes in US savings-investment balance and the US current account 
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Box 7, continued 
Is this inevitable because savings-investment data are derived from the 
national accounts whereas the current account data are derived principally 
from foreign trade statistics? This does not seem to be the case judging from 
what other countries report. The figure below shows exactly the same data for 
the UK. It is apparent that the UK data do not contain the inconsistency that 
one observes for the US. In the case of the UK, the equation explains 98% of the 
variation in the current account and the coefficient on the savings investment 
balance is almost exactly equal to one. 
Figure 2.11 The savings-investment balance and the current account: The UK 
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3.  The Oil Price and the Sudden 
Emergence of Another Source of 
Excess Savings 
In the last few years, another source of excess savings has appeared and 
grown very rapidly: the rising surplus of OPEC countries, documented in 
Table 2.2 above. This surplus is destined to grow even further in the current 
year as oil prices have stayed above their average 2005 level. The reason for 
the emergence of this surplus is quite simple: ever-rising oil prices transfer 
wealth from oil-consuming countries to oil-producing countries, and oil-
producing countries have a higher propensity to save out of current income. 
There are several reasons why OPEC and other oil-producing 
countries are not spending their windfall immediately. First, despite the 
existence of futures market pricing, there is considerable uncertainty about 
the future path of oil prices, and thus the marginal propensity to consume 
may be very low in the short run. Second, the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) are urging governments of oil-producing countries to 
build up stabilisation funds, advice that has been at least partially taken. 
This implies that governments are saving a substantial part of the windfalls 
that accrue to them in the form of higher royalties in order to raise national 
savings. These two mechanisms, both of which are based on the 
uncertainty surrounding future oil prices, are fundamentally very similar. 
We will return to this issue later. 
A simple calculation can show that the magnitudes involved are 
significant. Around 50 billion barrels a day are produced by countries that 
are not themselves big consumers. An oil price increase of $30 a barrel (e.g. 
from $30 to $60/barrel) implies a transfer to these producers of about $1.5 
billion per day, or around $550 billion per annum. If about one-half of this 
amount is initially saved, the increase in the oil price observed over the last 
year and a half is equivalent to a negative demand shock of about $250 A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 51 
 
billion for the oil-consuming countries. This alone would be equivalent to a 
drop in the investment ratio in both the US and the eurozone of over 1% of 
GDP. Under reasonable assumptions, the oil shock could thus have a 
significant impact on the global savings-investment balance. 
3.1  A strong demand shock? 
But are higher oil prices here to stay? The oil shock of the last few years 
indeed seems to be of a more permanent nature. During the 1990s, spot 
crude oil prices varied between $10 and $40 a barrel, but futures were 
stable at around $20 a barrel, signalling stability in the equilibrium price of 
oil at around this price. The last two years have witnessed a very different 
phenomenon, with a sharp acceleration of futures prices since early 2004 
towards today’s levels above $60 a barrel (see Figure 3.1 showing 2-year 
ahead future contracts). The futures markets are thus signalling that prices 
are expected to stay elevated, conferring on this oil price shock a more 
permanent nature. In order to understand the dynamics of recent oil price 
developments, it is fundamental to disentangle the shocks that have led to 
it. Current developments are a complex combination of supply, demand 
and portfolio shocks affecting oil markets.  
Figure 3.1 Two-year ahead WTI* crude futures price 
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* WTI = West Texas International (a standard grade of crude oil). 
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Demand growth has constantly been revised upwards over the last 
two years, as demand from emerging markets, especially from China which 
accounts for more than 40% of current demand growth, has been 
dramatically underestimated. Annual demand growth has increased over 
the past four years from 1% to over 3% in 2004. This increase in demand 
responds to a combination of factors, including higher economic growth, a 
sharp increase in the oil intensity of GDP of these countries as they adopt 
oil-consuming technologies, such as cars – Asia is projected to add 200 
million cars in the next 20 years, a third of them in China – and an increase 
in strategic demand. The last two points are very important, for they 
represent a permanent shift in the demand curve that is much more 
inelastic with respect to prices. The shift in the demand curve can be clearly 
seen in Figure 3.2, where the relationship between oil inventory levels and 
prices has changed dramatically since 2004.  
Figure 3.2 OECD oil stocks vs. crude prices 
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In fact, the replenishment of US strategic reserves accelerated in 
recent years, adding over 125 million barrels since 2002 – an increase of 
25% – to reach the total storage capacity of 727 million barrels.8 What is 
more relevant is that this increase represents almost one-half of 1% of 
annual production, not an insignificant number compared to the total 
increases in demand mentioned above. Note that these additions were all 
made in the context of rising prices, and an important contribution was 
made in 2004, thus adding to the marginal demand pressure against 
declining supply. Other countries are probably adopting similar strategies, 
and China has announced the creation of a strategic oil reserve. The 
rationale for all strategic reserves is ultimately an insurance against 
geopolitical risk. Therefore, geopolitical risk has been transformed from a 
risk premium worth a few extra dollars in the price of oil to an inelastic 
demand that is permanently increased. How long the governments of 
major oil-consuming countries will keep adding to their reserves remains 
therefore a major wildcard for the oil outlook. The debate may change in 
the post-Katrina era, as the evidence on the scarcity of supply – see below – 
may induce the authorities to relax the conditions for the use of strategic 
petroleum reserves (SPRs) across the world in an attempt to introduce two-
way price risk.  
3.2  A very tight supply situation 
The response of supply has been very slow, to say the least. True, OPEC 
has been increasing production, but non-OPEC production has been 
sluggish. In addition, spare production capacity has fallen below 2 million 
b/d (and is probably now below 1 million b/d). Companies have not 
invested in new capacity in recent years, fearing a possible decline of prices 
towards $20/barrel and confronting the fact that remaining reserves are 
significantly costlier to extract than the mature basins the market is now 
draining. As an example, the lifting costs of the oil reserves in the US 
midwest – comparable in size to those of Saudi Arabia – is about $15/barrel, 
requiring prices of about $50/barrel to justify the investment required for 
extraction. By comparison, the lifting cost of Saudi Arabian oil is about 
$1.50/barrel. In addition, political turbulence in the areas that contain the 
                                                      
8 The average price paid for this reserve is about $27/barrel. At current prices, this 
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cheaper available resources – not only in Saudi Arabia, but also in Russia 
and Venezuela, for example – is redirecting investment towards higher-cost 
and lower-return areas, compounding the problem. 
A stabilisation of prices at around $35/barrel was seen by many 
companies as a precondition to resume investing, and thus the current 
outlook will provide a good test of this hypothesis. So far, oil companies 
have been returning cash to shareholders through share buybacks (for 
example, in 2005, Exxon bought back almost $10 billion and BP over $7 
billion) rather than invest in new capacity. And this is taking place in a 
context in which spare capacity is at its lowest level in 30 years, with 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that it was almost 30 years ago when the last 
refinery in the US was built. In fact, refining capacity has fallen by about 
10%, despite the sharp increase in gasoline demand. 
Furthermore, geopolitical disruption risk to supply, both in the 
northern Persian Gulf – where all the spare production capacity lies – and 
in other producing countries and chokepoints, is higher and likely to 
remain so for the foreseeable future. The recent hardening of the stance of 
the US and EU against Iran only adds to this tension. Historically low 
spare-production capacity for an essential and strategic commodity like oil, 
with the United States de facto at war in the Middle East, should require a 
higher real price for oil.  
In fact, the impact of Hurricane Katrina on oil prices in September 
2004 reveals the overall perception of tightness of supply. Katrina knocked 
off 1.4 million barrels/day of Gulf of Mexico oil production, representing 
just about 2% of total world supply. Only 14 refineries were affected, 
accounting for a small percentage of total world capacity. Despite these 
relatively small numbers, prices spiked up in a major way, with oil prices 
reaching $70/barrel and gasoline prices increasing as much as 30% in 
Europe and the US. Stock releases of the US SPR and other countries’ 
strategic reserves contributed to calm the jitters, and energy prices – with 
the exception of gasoline – had fallen back to pre-Katrina levels within two 
weeks of the event.  
In fact, the impact of Katrina shows that over-consumption of 
gasoline is the real problem the world is facing. Even before Katrina struck, 
oil prices were elevated because of inadequate global refining capacity. The 
marginal barrels on offer, from Saudi Arabia and from the SPR, are mostly 
‘sour oil’, which requires refining to become the light sweet crude that is in 
demand and that benchmarks oil prices.  A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 55 
 
Thus, in this context, a key policy question is how to rebalance 
gasoline consumption around the world. As Table 3.1 shows, despite being 
a global spot gasoline market, retail gasoline prices differ drastically across 
regions. Asian countries are heavily subsidising gasoline consumption 
while European countries are heavily taxing it, with the US somewhat in 
the middle. In a world where a probably long-lasting supply/demand 
imbalance is emerging, and where most of the excess demand is coming 
from Asian emerging countries, wouldn’t it make sense to alter the 
incentives and eliminate the subsidies to gasoline consumption?  
Table 3.1 World gasoline prices, August 2005 
  Retail price/ 
gallon 
Average world 
spot price 
Retail - spot 
price 
Europe      
France    $ 5.61    $ 2.13    $ 3.48  
Germany   $ 5.97    $ 2.13    $ 3.84  
United Kingdom   $ 6.02    $ 2.13    $ 3.89  
Mean   $ 5.12    $ 2.13    $ 2.99  
     
Asia      
China   $ 1.89    $ 2.13    $ (0.24) 
India   $ 1.04    $ 2.13    $ (1.09) 
Japan   $ 4.43    $ 2.13    $ 2.30  
Mean   $ 2.44      $ 0.31  
     
North America       
United States   $ 2.96    $ 2.13    $ 0.83  
Mean   $ 2.77      $ 0.64  
Source: Bloomberg. 
 
A final important issue is that, as we emphasised above, futuresprices 
have increased in line with spot prices i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  o t h e r  c r u d e  p r i c e  
spikes. In principle, this should mean that both demand and supply should 
react rather strongly to higher prices. This will be a key element in the 
longer-term outlook for the supply-demand balance discussed in section 
3.4 below. 
In fact, contango is a typical leading indicator of a decline in prices. 
The spread between the 1st and 2nd contract reached an all-time wide in 
spring 2005 and has remained elevated since then (see Figure 3.3).  56 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
Figure 3.3 Contango/backwardation and spot oil prices ($) 
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Contango situations, like the one we are seeing now, have appeared 
historically when there have been ample physical oil supplies. The 
difference is that today’s accumulation is largely voluntary, as market 
participants are accumulating ‘excess’ inventories as a precautionary action 
against a possible disruption of supply in a world with barely any excess 
capacity. As inventories swell, the oil prices move into contango, essentially 
discounting the price of the next-delivered barrel vs. oil delivered at a later 
date. This can be interpreted as a storage cost phenomenon: barrels have to 
be priced at a discount as cheap storage sites vanish. Potential producers 
can actually already today sell part of their future output at high prices. 
The same applies also to the demand side. Industries considering 
investment in energy savings will also be able to ensure that such 
investments remain profitable. In general, the higher long-term future 
p r i c e s  o f  o i l ,  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h a t  o f  other energy sources, especially coal, 
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stronger than if future prices were much below the spot level. All in all, one 
would thus expect a rather strong medium-term reaction of both demand 
and supply to higher prices.9  
3.3  An important portfolio shock 
An important portfolio shock that exerts constant upward pressure on oil 
prices has added to the apparent discrepancy between demand and supply: 
an unprecedented inflow of capital into commodities as an alternative 
investment.  That flow was largely precipitated by investment failure in 
other areas (equities) initially, but became self-sustaining. Long-only index 
strategies allocate a portion of resources to commodity indices, such as the 
GSCI and the DJAIG, seeking returns from price appreciation and the 
convenience yield of the forward curve.  
Inflow into commodity indices has been very large: the compounded 
annual growth rate since 1991 has been over 30%, and about 50% since 2001. 
How big is this figure? A good yardstick is to compare it with the open 
interest of the relative futures markets. The capital in commodity indices 
owns about 40% of the crude futures open interest, 40% of the unleaded 
futures open interest, 40% of heating oil open interest and 25% of the 
natural gas open interest. 
This inflow has two characteristics. First, it is long-only, with a trend-
following strategy, whereby it is not likely to sell for anything less than a 
few years of bad returns. Thus, commodity indexation has taken on an 
autonomous life, and momentum investing is replacing the traditional 
portfolio theory: managers who entered the market early in the upswing 
are outperforming those who didn’t, and increasing interest among 
pension fund managers is leading to self-fulfilling prophecies of 
commodity bullishness. The vast disparity between the sizes of the 
financial markets and the commodity markets is likely to cause painful 
dislocations in commodity-consuming businesses as investors distort the 
prices of some key commodities. For example, estimates of total retirement 
money in the US are at around $8 trillion, or about 60 times the size of the 
                                                      
9 Econometric studies of the oil market typically use price elasticities on the order 
of 0.1-0.3 for both supply and demand (see Gately, 2004, and Gately & Huntington, 
2002), but the permanent nature of some of these shocks would cast strong doubts 
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entire commodity futures market. In other words, if 2% of retirement 
money were to move into commodities, the size of positions in the futures 
markets would double.  
Second, arbitrage arguments explain why an increase in demand for 
front end futures can lead to price appreciation across the curve, thus 
causing the contango – back months being more expensive than front 
months – in the market. The argument is as follows: as we suggested above, 
long-only indexers seek to benefit from price appreciation and the yield of 
the forward curve. The convenience yield is captured by buying a deferred 
contract and holding it until some period prior to maturity, when it is 
rolled forward into another contract month. This strategy makes money if 
the forward curve is downward sloping, and loses money if it is upward 
sloping. The forward curve for physical commodities is a function of the 
cost and availability of storage, interest rates, short-term supply and 
demand dynamics and expectations for future price trends. Historically, 
crude oil tends to exhibit a pattern of becoming more backwardated – that 
is, the forward curve is more downward sloping – when prices rise, and 
less backwardated when prices fall. Thus, the current situation, in which 
the curve begins to slope upwards as prices rise, is very atypical. One 
reason for this structural break is the existence of this new class of long-
only index investors: as the market has learnt their strategy of rolling 
forward the contracts to capture the convenience yield, markets have 
started front-running this roll-over, bidding up the prices of the more 
distant futures contracts, and thus the process of chasing higher prices has 
slowly become self-reinforcing.  
Interestingly, speculative investors have not been behind the recent 
price volatility and major price spikes. A recent study by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (Haigh et al., 2005) shows that hedging 
participants, including merchants, producers and refiners, change their 
positions often in response to market developments, leading hedge funds 
to change their positions in response. It is not a ‘speculative bubble’ that 
has led to the acceleration in commodity prices – in fact, despite a large fall 
in long speculative positions since mid-2004, oil prices continued rising – 
but rather a combination of fundamentals and new investment strategies. 
3.4  The longer-term outlook for oil prices 
We have emphasised so far that one key aspect of the increase in crude oil 
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is the case all along the curve, not only for deliveries a couple of month 
ahead, but also for deliveries years ahead as documented above. These 
forward prices imply that future spot prices should stay high. This can 
represent an equilibrium only if demand is expected to continue growing 
strongly despite higher prices and that supply does not react much either to 
higher prices (over the last years there has been no large ‘exogenous shock’ 
to supply, apart from temporary events, such as the usual spikes in Middle 
East political uncertainty). This scenario of continuing tight conditions in 
the oil market as far as the eye can see which is implicit in forward prices, is 
difficult to reconcile with the historical record. Over the last 15 years, 
demand growth has consistently oscillated around a value somewhat 
below 2% per annum (if measured over five-year intervals – see Figure 3.4 
below).10 The (spot) price had also, until 2004, fluctuated around a stable 
level of around $30/barrel (in real, inflation adjusted terms).  
Is there any reason to believe that global oil demand growth will 
suddenly accelerate much above the trend (+/- 2% per annum) to which it 
settled down for about two decades after the price gyrations produced by 
the two previous oil shocks (1973, 1979)? It is unlikely that global growth 
will accelerate much over the next few years since global growth was 
already at close to its record in 2004 and 2005. But the weight of the faster-
growing emerging markets is increasing (their growth rates are already at a 
record, but their weight increases constantly), and they are growing on the 
b a c k  o f  f a s t  g r o w t h  i n  i n d u s t r y  and transportation, which are highly 
energy-intensive. Hence many argue that oil demand will be driven by 
emerging markets. This is at first sight an attractive hypothesis since over 
the last decade (a five-year horizon yields similar results), almost three-
quarters of total demand growth has come from emerging markets (see 
Table 3.2 below). However, much of the increased oil (and generally energy) 
demand by EMEs might simply be due to the fact that manufacturing 
activity (which is energy-intensive) shifts from OECD countries to EMEs. 
Thus, the underlying increase in global oil demand may be lower than 
commonly estimated once the additions to ‘strategic’ oil reserves in the US 
and China (and possibly elsewhere) are taken into account.  
                                                      
10  Before the late 1990s, consumption grew less (or was contracting) under the 
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As an aside, one might note that there is indeed a marked difference 
between the EU and the US in terms of oil consumption: the US has been 
responsible for almost one-quarter of the global increase in oil consumption, 
against less than 10% for the EU. However, in terms of overall energy 
consumption (in the long run, different forms of energy are fungible), the 
difference between the EU and the US is much smaller, and can be entirely 
explained by the higher growth of the US. The image of a ‘gas-guzzling’ US 
with its SUVs against a ‘thrifty’ EU is correct if one looks only at oil, but in 
terms of overall energy consumption (or even more in terms of marginal 
energy efficiency of GDP), there is little difference, probably because of the 
higher share of industry in GDP in the EU.  
Table 3.2 Partition of global increase in energy consumption, 1994-2004 (in %) 
 Crude  oil Primary  energy 
Global total  100.0  100.0 
OECD 37.2  35.4 
of which: EU-25  9.0  9.6 
US 22.5  13.5 
FSU -8.8  -2.5 
EMEs 71.6  67.1 
Source: BP, World Energy Review, 2005. 
By how much would global oil demand growth have to accelerate so 
that the present level of prices represents an equilibrium? As a starting 
point, one can observe that the end-2005 price of around $60 per barrel 
represents roughly a doubling (in real terms) compared to the previous 
decade average. In other words, the question is whether a doubling of the 
price is needed to keep demand and supply in balance over the next decade. 
Most studies of the oil market find a long-term elasticity of both 
demand and supply of between 0.1 and 0.3. Taking a value in the middle 
would imply that a doubling of the price (i.e. an increase of 100%) should 
lead to an increase in supply of about 20% and a fall in consumption (ceteris 
paribus) by a similar amount. Ceteris paribus, this implies that over the ‘long 
run’, let us say a decade, a gap of around 40% should open up between 
demand and supply. This would imply that demand growth would need to 
accelerate to around 4%, double the previous medium-term average for 
current price levels to be sustained. A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 61 
 
Is there any reason to believe that the elasticity of oil demand has 
declined? The share of energy in general and oil in particular in GDP has 
actually fallen in recent decades and the price of coal, one important 
substitute for oil (at least in electricity generation), has not increased 
significantly. Both facts suggest that there is little reason to believe that the 
elasticity of demand has fallen. On the contrary, the relative stability of the 
price of coal means that the potential to substitute oil by other energy 
sources should actually be rather high – at least in emerging markets,11 for 
the switching has already taken place to a large extent in OECD countries. 
The one element working in the opposite direction is that it is still difficult 
to substitute oil by other resources in transportation, and a quantum leap is 
taking place in this area in many emerging markets. However, 
transportation, while an important part of overall oil demand, still accounts 
for only about one-third of the total. 
All in all, there is thus little reason to believe that the increase in oil 
prices observed during 2004 and 2005 will continue. In the medium to 
longer run, real prices are likely to stabilise and might even decline slightly 
if supply continues to expand as it has done regularly until recently. The 
big ‘if’ is thus the outlook for supply. Our analysis assumes that supply will 
behave as in the past and continue to be available to balance demand at 
current price levels (which reduce demand). The key question is thus 
whether the world will be able to find enough new capacity. There are 
many views (Matt Simmons’ 2005 Twilight in the Desert being the most 
prominent) that argue that the supply curve is kinked so that the years of 
plentiful and inexpensive oil supplies are over and that the future holds a 
much more difficult and expensive search for new sources of oil capacity. If 
one considers, in addition, that the likely sources of new capacity are in the 
areas of the world where geopolitical risk is higher, the view that supply 
will be available at the same conditions as in the past has to be qualified to 
some extent. We do not wish to take a position on this issue. It is likely that 
the marginal cost of finding new sources of oil increases over time, but we 
doubt that it has suddenly doubled in the space of two years after having 
been roughly constant for decades. 
                                                      
11 China is a case in point: here large coal reserves can satisfy most of the rapidly 
increasing energy needs of the manufacturing industry, but not of transportation, 
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This analysis has two important implications: 
At a stable (or slightly declining) oil price, one would expect that the 
savings rate of the oil exporters declines gradually as their consumption 
catches up to the increase in income. This happened rather quickly after the 
previous oil shocks, but the adjustment to higher income levels might be 
slower this time because most countries have learned from their mistakes 
and have created sizeable reserve funds. 
If it is difficult to explain the doubling of prices along the entire curve 
with pure long-term supply and demand considerations. Other factors 
seem to have been at work. As mentioned above, there is some indication 
that the run-up in oil prices was linked to increased interest by financial 
investors. In part this reflected the increased recognition of commodities as 
an asset class, but it also may have reflected an increase in demand for 
commodities as an inflation hedge. There is thus some indication that the 
run-up in oil prices was at least partially related to the liquidity glut 
engineered by the G-3 central banks in their attempt to get their economies 
moving again. 
Figure 3.4 Global oil consumption and real prices 
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4.  Theories to Fit the Facts 
Our historical analysis of the phenomena of falling real interest rates and 
rising current account imbalances has given rise to competing theories 
about the fundamental drivers of these developments. Recognition of the 
latter is obviously necessary to design policies able to put the world on a 
course back towards equilibrium. In this chapter, we discuss two opposing 
views about the heart of the matter: the ‘savings glut’ and the ‘liquidity 
glut’ hypotheses. 
4.1  Enter the savings glut hypothesis 
In a speech on 10 March 2005, Ben Bernanke, then a member of the Board of 
Governors of the US Federal Reserve System and now Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, pointed to a rising supply of international savings from 
emerging markets as a stable source of financing of the US current account 
deficit and the reason for low real world interest rates.  
The excess savings story is by its nature difficult to verify (or 
disprove) because ex post savings must equal investment. But it might still 
be useful to describe the pattern of savings rates over the last five years, i.e. 
since the start of the decline in real interest rates (which coincides with the 
bursting of the internet bubble). We have described above the broad 
pattern of savings and investment rates of the G-3 economies. For this 
group of countries, the stylised facts seem to be as follows: 
•  In the US, savings collapsed after 2000, falling from 18% to about 13% 
of GDP.  
•  In the rest of the group of ‘advanced economies’ (as defined by the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook), savings rates stayed roughly constant. 
The rest of the world, however, behaved quite differently. If one 
divides the rest of the world into oil and non-oil emerging market 
economies (EMEs), one observes that the savings rates of the oil producers 
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for 2005 it has gone above 38%, an increase of over 13% of GDP between 
these two years. In the meantime, however, there were also significant 
swings in line with swings in the price of oil. The non-oil group in contrast 
has experienced a trend-wise increase in its savings rate from around 25% 
of GDP to around 32%. 
Looking at investment, the data show much less variability: there is 
little difference between the US and the rest of the advanced economies 
(some increase towards 2000, some reduction until 2002 and near-full 
recovery by 2005). In the fuel exporters group, investment has fluctuated 
around 25% of GDP, with no discernible trend – but there is an uptick to 
about 27% of GDP in recent years. In the non-fuel producers group, 
investment is trending upwards, from around 25% to 30% of GDP (slightly 
less than the increase in savings).12 
4.2  The savings vs. the liquidity glut hypotheses 
The savings glut hypothesis sees high emerging market savings as the 
cause of low world interest rates, and regards strong US consumption as 
the main countervailing force against world recession. An opposing view – 
we call it the liquidity glut hypothesis – sees excessively low central bank 
interest rates as the cause of overpriced assets and persistent savings-
investment imbalances. Whether present low levels of interest rates and 
current account balances are sustainable depends on who is right in this 
debate. 
In his speech, Mr. Bernanke characterised the savings glut hypothesis 
as “somewhat unconventional”. However, the core of his argument can be 
traced back to Karl Marx’ theory of under-consumption. According to Marx, 
                                                      
12  In the IMF’s 2005 World Economic Outlook, world aggregates were weighted 
averages of advanced economies and EMEs aggregates, with the weights based on 
GDP at PPP (purchasing power parity). The aggregate series pointed to an increase 
in world savings over the last few years by around 1% of world GDP, but this was 
misleading: world savings have not increased if one sums national data in current 
dollar terms. The PPP-based GDP data give the EMEs a greater weight than if one 
were to just add current dollars. However, if one wants to examine the global 
savings/investment balance, the PPP weights are not appropriate since one dollar 
of net savings in China must offset one dollar of dis-savings somewhere else (e.g. 
the US), even if this dollar can buy many more haircuts in China than in the US. A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 65 
 
the “original accumulation of capital” begins when subsistence farmers 
move to factories and are thus separated from their “means of production”. 
The factory owners – the capitalists – pay their workers less than the value 
they create and use the difference to increase the capital stock. With wages 
depressed, aggregate consumption is low while savings and investment are 
growing fast. Reflecting the lack of final demand for the goods they 
produce, the capitalists ruin each other and monopoly suppliers emerge, 
until the impoverished masses overthrow the existing order. 
Applying Marx’ analysis of industrialisation in 19th century Great 
Britain to present-day developments in emerging market economies could 
lead us to conclude that industrialisation there is equally associated with 
under-consumption and a savings surplus. The key difference between 
now and then would be that excess savings in emerging market economies 
today are being used to finance US consumption. Thus, a new equilibrium 
growth path would emerge and capitalism would be saved from itself. But 
before we embrace this – let’s call it ‘new-Marxian’ – analysis, we should 
note that Marx seriously underestimated the income and consumption 
growth of the working classes unleashed by industrialisation. In the event, 
capitalism thrived because it was capable of creating the consumers for the 
goods it produced. Hence, a savings glut does not necessarily follow from 
rapid industrialisation. 
Another explanation for low world interest rates is a global policy of 
easy money. As emerging market economies industrialise and subsistence 
farmers become factory workers, the world capital-labour ratio declines. 
This exerts downward pressure on wages and consumer price inflation but 
raises the return to capital. In advanced economies, low wage competition 
from emerging markets may cause adjustment frictions which could 
depress aggregate demand. 
Since labour is particularly cheap (and the return to capital especially 
high) in emerging markets, industrialised country companies are more 
inclined to raise investment and to create additional jobs there rather than 
at home (especially if they still see overcapacity there created during the 
last investment boom). With industrialised country growth sluggish as a 
result – and inflation contained by low-wage competition from abroad – 
central banks in these countries will try to support activity through a policy 
of low interest rates. Since business investment may not show much 
response, central banks will have to aim for an interest rate level low 
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through rising real estate prices. In fact, the downward pressure on wages 
resulting from the emerging market economies entering the world trading 
system leads to a permanently higher share of wealth vs. wages in 
consumers’ disposable income. As real estate prices and consumption react 
differently across countries to the interest rate stimulus, large current 
account imbalances are created and real estate prices may accelerate 
beyond fundamental levels.  
The core of this argument has some resemblance to the so-called 
‘Austrian business cycle’ theory, according to which business-cycle upturns 
are characterised by strong investment growth based on expectations of 
increases in productivity and returns to investment. But expectations may 
run ahead of reality and lead to over-investment and a misallocation of 
capital. This situation is exacerbated if monetary policy exploits inflation 
inertia and pushes the real financing rate temporarily below its ‘natural’ 
level (as defined by Wicksell). In the event, a fall in the return to capital and 
a return of the real financing rate to its natural level will lead to an 
investment downturn and recession, in which excess capacities are 
‘liquidated’. 
Applying the Austrian theory to present-day events, we could argue 
that efforts by industrialised countries’ central banks to prop up 
industrialised country investment through low interest rates at a time when 
more productive investment opportunities should exist in emerging market 
economies leads to over-investment and a mis-allocation of capital. When 
return expectations are frustrated or real interest rates move back towards 
their ‘natural’ level, investment will plunge and the economy will contract 
until the excess capacity is liquidated. Thus, what looks like a savings glut 
in new-Marxian analysis appears as an investment glut in the Austrian 
analysis. 
The implications of these two competing explanations are very 
important. If the world economy is characterised by a savings glut 
emanating from emerging market economies, it may well remain in a stable 
(low interest rate) equilibrium as long as US consumers can be persuaded 
to spend and emerging markets continue to save. However, if world 
economic growth is sustained by excessively low central bank interest rates 
boosting real estate prices and current account imbalances to unsustainable 
levels, adjustment will sooner or later have to take place. The longer rates 
stay at abnormally low levels, the higher real estate prices climb, and the A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 67 
 
larger current account imbalances get, the higher the risk that adjustment 
will eventually be disruptive. 
To provide a more structured discussion of the savings and liquidity 
glut hypotheses, it is helpful to express the theories in the context of a 
simple economic model. The following set of equations offers one 
possibility among others to do this: 
(1)  S = I + (NAFA – NIFL) 
(2)  I = I(PA, OTHER) 
(3)  PA = PA(NAFA) 
(4)  NIFL = NIFL(r), 
where S denotes savings, I non-financial investment, NAFA net 
acquisition of financial assets, NIFL net incurrence of financial liabilities, 
PA the price of (financial and non-financial) assets, OTHER other factors 
determining investment, and r the interest rate. With seven variables in this 
system of four equations, we need to determine three variables 
exogenously to solve it. An obvious choice is OTHER, but the selection of 
the second and third exogenous variable depends on how we interpret the 
savings glut hypothesis. Before we turn to this, let’s first have a look at the 
equations. 
The first equation is familiar from the national accounting identity 
equating national savings (S) to non-financial investment (I) plus net 
lending (NAFA-NIFL). In the case of an individual country, differences 
between S and I reflect lending to other countries, which gives rise to 
current account imbalances. Equation (2) relates investment to the price of 
assets and other factors (from which we abstract here). Following Tobin’s Q 
theory, we assume that a rise in the price of assets induces more investment. 
The third equation stipulates that the price of assets rises with money spent 
on the net acquisition of financial assets while equation (4) relates net 
lending to the level of the interest rate. 
To describe the savings glut hypothesis for the US in this framework, 
w e  a s s u m e  N A F A  a n d  N I F L  t o  b e  e x o g enous. A rise in foreign capital 
inflows raises the net incurrence of financial liabilities (NIFL). With net 
acquisition of financial assets (NAFA) assumed to remain stable, non-
financial investment remains unaffected, but savings (S) and the interest 
rate (r) drop. Hence, we end up with a US current account deficit (reflected 
in a decline of NAFA-NIFL) and lower US interest rates. Clearly, Mr. 
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from lower interest rates to the acquisition of financial assets, asset prices 
and investment, but we believe that our simple approach captures the 
essence of the argument: a world savings glut creates a US current account 
deficit and depresses US interest rates. 
But how can a world savings glut emerge and can the savings glut 
hypothesis also explain downward pressure on world interest rates? To 
answer this question, we restate our basic model for world aggregates. For 
the world as a whole, net acquisition of financial assets must of course 
equal net incurrence of financial liabilities and world savings must be equal 
to world non-financial investments – at least in theory, the world cannot 
run a current account imbalance with itself. Adding this constraint to our 
model gives: 
(1’)  S = I + (NAFA – NIFL) 
(2’)  I = I(PA, OTHER) 
(3’)  PA = PA(NAFA) 
(4’)  NIFL = NIFL(r) 
(5)  NAFA = NIFL 
We now have five equations and the same number of seven variables, 
making it necessary to choose two exogenous variables. Apart from 
OTHER, there is only one sensible choice now: the interest rate r. Let’s 
assume that there is a world central bank that can push r lower for 
exogenous reasons. As a result, net borrowing, i.e. NIFL, increases, pushing 
net lending (NAFA) higher by the same amount. Asset prices (PA) increase, 
raising non-financial investment (I), to which savings (S) adjust. Of course, 
OTHER factors may at the same time push investment down more 
forcefully so that a decline in r and a rise in NIFL, NAFA and PA can all go 
along with a drop in I and S. Clearly, when we restate our model for the 
world economy, we may again observe a decline in (world) interest rates 
and an increase in (world) savings, but causality from rates to savings now 
appears more sensible than from savings to rates (as we assumed in the one 
country case above). Moreover, other factors may well overwrite the 
relationship between the world interest rate and savings. 
We have explained above how, in our view, central banks countered 
the worldwide investment downturn in the wake of the 2000-02 stock 
market crash by aggressively lowering interest rates, thereby boosting asset 
(and in particular real estate) prices with positive knock-on effects on 
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investment recovering in 2004, but admitted our puzzlement about the 
further decline in capital market rates in this economic environment. 
All these developments can be more clearly explained in the above 
framework. The downturn in investment was driven by OTHER factors (i.e., 
the stock market crash) in equation (2’). In order to prevent the investment 
downturn causing a major recession, the US Federal Reserve lowered rates 
aggressively. Other central banks followed the expansionary monetary 
policy of the Fed to support their economies and to prevent a sharp 
appreciation of their currencies against the US dollar. With no signs of 
inflation, the cut of world central bank rates brought the world capital 
market rate r down. This boosted borrowing (4’) and lending (5), raised 
asset prices (3’), and helped investment to recover (2’). 
There is no feedback mechanism in our model, however, from 
economic recovery to rates. An increase in rates depends entirely on the 
central banks’ reaction to economic recovery. Assume that central banks 
target inflation and growth and that the world labour supply is augmented 
by incorporating workers previously occupied in subsistence agriculture in 
emerging markets into the world economy. As a result, the world capital-
labour ratio falls, exerting downward pressure on wages and consumer 
goods inflation worldwide while raising the return to capital. In advanced 
economies, low-wage competition from emerging markets may cause 
adjustment frictions weighing on aggregate demand. 
In this environment of low inflation and sluggish aggregate demand, 
central banks will keep official rates – and hence the cost of loanable funds 
– very low. This – and increasing profit margins – raises financial 
borrowing (NIFL) and asset prices (PA). World investment (I) picks up – 
with world savings (S) adjusting endogenously – and the world capital 
stock rises, gradually bringing the world capital-labour ratio back to a more 
normal level. Thus, low inflation, low interest rates, rising asset prices and 
increasing investment are all necessary features to accommodate the large 
increase in the world supply of labour due to the opening of China, India 
and other emerging market economies. Industrialisation in the latter may 
even imply a savings-investment surplus there when the move of people 
from farms to factories raises their productivity by more than their 
permanent income (and consumption) growth and the economy’s ability to 
turn additional savings into productive investment is limited. Hence, what 
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world savings and investment needed to endow additional labour with 
capital. 
But not all investment is equally productive. Assume that business 
investment is more productive than housing investment and that 
companies want to increase the business sector capital stock primarily in 
emerging market economies, where the new, cheap labour is abundantly 
available. Assume further that the world interest rate is set by the G3 
central banks (G3CBs) but, given their mandate, they focus primarily on 
domestic inflation and growth. In this case, G3 business investment may 
respond only weakly to low costs of borrowing (as G3 companies want to 
build up production capacities in emerging markets) and the G3CBs, 
aiming to support US investment, may push the world interest rate below 
the equilibrium level. The result would be excess borrowing and excessive 
increases in world asset prices, and possibly excess investment in low 
productivity capital, e.g. housing. 
Following a sufficiently strong stimulus from low interest rates, 
investment (and GDP growth) may eventually pick up in the G3, inducing 
the G3CBs to begin withdrawing their monetary stimulus. However, with 
asset prices high (and for some asset classes possibly above fundamentally 
justified values), the central banks may feel that the change in the monetary 
policy stance should be implemented very carefully. Hence, they may want 
to signal markets that rates are unlikely to rise above a ‘neutral’ level, and 
that even the move to this level will be engineered very carefully. With the 
pace of official rate increases assumed by market participants to be 
‘measured’ and the top of official rates seen tightly capped, term risk 
premia will be compressed and capital market rates will converge closely 
towards official rates. This is what we are presently experiencing: the Fed is 
slowly withdrawing accommodation, the ECB is following even more 
slowly despite excessive credit and money growth, and the Bank of Japan is 
only now preparing the exit from the policy regime of quantitative easing.  
4.3  A few empirical observations 
Rigorous tests of the two hypotheses against each other are hardly possible. 
What we can do, however, is check which hypothesis is better aligned with 
the facts. As mentioned above, there is no clear evidence of a rise in 
aggregate world savings. In fact, it seems that an increase in emerging 
markets’ savings has been offset by a decline in industrialised countries’ 
savings (once one uses the proper weights, see above). Figure 4.1 shows A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 71 
 
that indeed world savings have slightly declined, as a percentage of GDP, if 
one compares 2005 to 2000 (and the preceding years). With international 
capital markets fairly well integrated, the drop in world real interest rates is 
therefore difficult to explain by a savings glut. 
Figure 4.1 World savings (as a % of GDP) 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
Dooley et al. (2004) have argued that it is an increase in the 
internationally mobile – and not the total – supply of world savings that 
has exerted downward pressure on world interest rates. They see China as 
the source of the increase in international savings despite the fact that 
China still does not have an open capital market. In their view, the Chinese 
authorities have contributed to the emergence of a current account surplus 
by keeping the yuan low against the US dollar through massive exchange 
rate intervention, which by far exceeded the current account surplus 
because they also had to neutralise the impact of the equally large inflows 
of FDI and other, more short-term capital the country is receiving. 
However, China’s net savings surplus is only part of the whole pattern of 
international current account imbalances. Taken on its own, savings 
exports from China do not seem large enough to explain the decline in 
world real interest rates (and the rise of the US current account deficit – see 
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Against this background, it seems to us that there is some evidence 
supporting the liquidity glut hypothesis. For one thing, risk premia in bond, 
credit, real estate and equity markets have been unusually compressed in 
recent years13 – which has often reflected pressures from excess liquidity in 
search of investment opportunities. For another, world money growth has 
exceeded world GDP growth by considerable margins in recent years (see 
Figure 4.2). Finally, anecdotal evidence of speculative behaviour in real 
estate markets has been abundant, especially in the US, where former 
Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan has characterised it as “pockets of 
froth in the real estate market”.  
Figure 4.2 Growth in GDP and money, 1984-2004 
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Source: Data for the US, Japan, Euroland, the UK and China. 
 
In conclusion, it seems that the emergence of the savings glut in the 
latter part of the 1990s, combined with the post-bubble deflation scare, led 
central banks to create a liquidity glut that compressed risk premia and 
boosted asset prices. The challenge will now be to mop up the excess 
liquidity in an orderly fashion.  
                                                      
13   See Alan Greenspan’s recent speech in Jackson Hole, Wyoming 
(www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050826/default.htm) 
where he makes explicit reference to the compressed risk premia in financial 
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4.4  The key factor behind the problem: The curse of the domestic 
Phillips curve 
The key driver of world liquidity growth has been very loose central bank 
policy stances. Real short interest rates in the G3 have been very low for 
some time, mostly negative during the last three years, as the US Federal 
Reserve and the European Central Bank slashed rates to protect against the 
deflation scare and Japan entered a policy of quantitative easing to prevent 
a deflationary spiral. Faced with weak growth, low inflation and a 
weakening dollar, world central banks opted for a policy of easy money to 
insure against the downside risks to growth. In fact, despite its specific 
focus on money, the ECB has tolerated greater money and credit expansion 
in Euroland, relative to economic growth, than has occurred in the US, and 
real estate markets in several Euroland countries show considerable 
similarities with the hotter parts of the US real estate market. 
However, the G3 central banks have operated under different 
conditions. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) has been trying to push the economy 
out of deflation and, with rates already at zero, a policy of monetary 
expansion has looked adequate. The ECB for a while was faced with an 
appreciating exchange rate, and thus a looser monetary policy that roughly 
offset the tightening induced by the exchange rate was appropriate. The 
key player remains the Federal Reserve. Faced with a depreciating 
exchange rate and a significant fiscal expansion, it still adopted a loose 
monetary policy, which was only corrected at a very gradual pace. Thus, 
the achievement of internal balance resulted in the deterioration of the 
external imbalance.  
The key to understanding this development is that central banks 
determine domestic monetary policy on the basis of domestic conditions – 
i.e., the main driver of monetary policy decisions is the domestic Phillips 
curve, which is a function of estimates of domestic potential output. Thus, 
the important question is: should monetary policy be driven only by 
domestic considerations in an increasingly globalised world with global 
capital markets?  
Presently, policy-makers seem to put US GDP growth consistent with 
low and stable inflation between 3% and 3.5%, in line with the trend 
increase of 3.2% during 1994-2005. However, while this rate over the last 10 
years indeed went along with a fairly stable annual average rate of 
consumer price inflation of about 2.5%, it was accompanied by a rapidly 
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GDP in 1994 to over 6% of GDP in 2005, as real exports and imports grew at 
trend rates of 4.0% and 8.0%, respectively. Over the last 10 years, 3.2% 
trend growth of real US GDP was obviously consistent with low and stable 
inflation – and hence internal equilibrium – but it was inconsistent with 
external equilibrium. 
In a small economy, such an inconsistency would not be sustainable 
for long. A rising external deficit would soon run into financing constraints, 
forcing the exchange rate down. A lower exchange rate would in the 
medium-term induce a reallocation of resources from the non-traded to the 
traded goods sector. In the short-term, however, it would probably trigger 
a rise in the price level. To counter a sustained increase in inflation, the 
central bank would need to prevent an easing of monetary conditions by 
raising interest rates to offset the effects from exchange rate depreciation. In 
the event, internal and external equilibrium would be restored. 
In contrast to the small-economy case, the US faces only a soft 
external financing constraint. Rising current account deficits can be readily 
financed over a long period of time until foreign investors begin to lose 
their appetite for US assets and begin to worry about the debt-servicing 
capacity of the US economy. The lack of a hard external financing 
constraint over a protracted period of time allows excess demand in the US 
economy without noticeable inflationary pressures. Excess demand for 
non-tradable goods is satisfied by continuously moving resources from the 
traded to the non-traded goods sector. As a growing amount of resources is 
employed in the non-traded goods sector, demand for non-traded goods 
can be sustained at stable prices. Excess demand for traded goods can be 
satisfied at stable prices through rising net imports financed by capital 
inflows. 
If technical progress raises productivity growth in the non-traded 
goods sector – as seems to have been the case in recent years – the 
reallocation of resources from the traded to the non-traded goods sector is 
even accompanied by an increase in measured trend GDP growth. A 
central bank concerned only with internal price stability will aim to keep 
growth in demand for non-tradable goods in line with the increase in their 
supply and be unperturbed by excess demand for tradable goods. The 
speed limit for monetary policy then is the rate at which resources can be 
reallocated from the traded to the non-traded goods sector. Especially in a 
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non-traded goods sector, monetary conditions created by this approach are 
much too easy to ensure both internal and external equilibrium. 
The accompanying Figure 4.3 shows three phases in the development 
of the ratio of value-added in the US non-tradable goods sector relative to 
the tradable goods sector since 1970. From 1970 to about 1981, the ratio 
remained broadly stable. In 1982, it began to increase at a steady rate 
(coinciding with the first period of large US current account deficits). Since 
1995, it seems that the rate of increase of this ratio rose to a higher level. 
This is also reflected in the rising slope of the polynomial trend fitted to the 
raw data. Figure 4.4 shows that the increasing growth in the non-traded 
goods sector relative to the traded goods sector was accompanied by a 
higher current account deficit. Developments in the ratio of non-traded to 
traded goods sector valued-added correlate especially closely with the 
current account deficit since 1996. 
Figure 4.3 US value-added (VA) in non-traded (NT) and traded goods (T) sectors 
(in current prices) 
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Sources: Deutsche Bank and OECD. 
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Figure 4.4 US non-traded-to-traded goods sector ratio and current account balance 
(% of GDP) 
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Sources: Deutsche Bank and OECD. 
 
Figure 4.5 compares developments of the non-traded-to-traded goods 
sector ratio in the US to that of Germany. The latter country experienced a 
one-off jump in this relationship at the time of German unification (1990-95), 
largely driven by a rise of value-added in the construction sector. The 
increase in the German ratio of non-tradable to tradable value-added 
coincides with a sharp deterioration of the German current account until 
about 1995. From then on, Germany provides a mirror image of the US. As 
domestic demand falters after the end of the rebuilding boom in Eastern 
Germany, the traded sector expands whereas the non-traded sector 
contracts. The ratio stabilises and the current account improves steadily. 
This is consistent with findings of lower productivity growth in the non-
traded goods sector, especially in retailing, in Europe compared to the US. 
Some economists have argued that this has been due to a lower increase in 
the use of information and communications technology in European 
retailing, probably caused by denser regulations reducing the intensity of 
competition. An alternative explanation would be that in a country with 
limited flexibility, it is simply difficult to shift resources between sectors. In 
Germany, for example, the non-traded sector was not allowed to shed 
labour at the same speed as its output contracted.  A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE? | 77 
 
Figure 4.5 US and German value-added in non-traded vs. traded goods sectors 
(current prices) 
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Sources: Deutsche Bank and OECD. 
An infinite rise in the US external deficit is of course impossible, but 
even a stabilisation at current levels is not sustainable for long. However, 
there is no easy way to restore US external equilibrium. Conventional 
wisdom expects gradual dollar depreciation to solve the problem. This 
would indeed slow the trend of resource reallocation to the non-traded 
goods sector and probably also force the Fed to raise rates to compensate 
for the easing of monetary conditions through the exchange rate decline. In 
the event, US domestic demand growth would have to slow to reflect the 
more limited ability of the US economy to supply both traded and non-
traded goods without additional foreign supply of traded goods. 
For this to work, other countries would have to be able to adjust to 
exchange rate appreciation and the associated reallocation of resources 
from the tradable to the non-tradable goods sector. However, if their non-
tradable goods sector is significantly less developed, or if adjustment costs 
are high due to economic rigidities, such a reallocation of resources could 
be accompanied by output losses. The former predicament may explain 
China’s aversion to yuan appreciation, the latter, the aversion of Euroland 
authorities to the rise of the euro. In China, as in other newly 
industrialising countries, productivity growth in the traded-goods sector is 
much higher than in the non-traded goods sector. Hence, growth policy 
must create conditions for resources to flow from the non-traded to the 
traded-goods sector, which requires a relatively low real exchange rate. In 78 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
Euroland, resources laid off in the traded-goods sector may become 
unemployed rather than be re-employed in the non-traded goods sector. 
Hence, for these countries, currency appreciation may appear as a threat to 
growth and employment. 
Therefore, if other countries resist upward pressures on their 
currencies and/or their efforts at structural reform are slow and incomplete, 
thus increasing the adjustment cost of the process, monetary policy will 
become too easy on a global scale. In the language of Dugger & Ubide 
(2004), the world is in a structural trap: cheap money becomes a substitute 
for reform, adjustment and hard policy choices. In an environment of 
readily available cheap labour, this may not raise world consumer price 
inflation in the near-term, but it is likely to boost asset and commodity 
prices, whose supply is more limited. Since international imbalances and 
the mis-pricing of assets are not sustainable forever, adjustment will 
eventually come, and rather abrupt exchange-rate and, especially, asset-
price changes cannot be ruled out. This could include a sharp dollar sell-off 
and a drop in worldwide bond, real estate and equity prices (which have 
recouped most of the losses when an earlier stark overvaluation was 
reduced in 2001-03). 
In fact, there is a positive correlation between current account deficits 
and asset price inflation. As Figure 4.6 shows, current account deficits are 
typically associated with housing price inflation above the long-term 
average, thus probably signalling some measure of overheating in the 
economy. Focusing on the external imbalance is thus akin to focusing on 
asset price inflation.  
In this environment, monetary policy should augment its reaction 
function with a special attention to asset price developments. It is true that 
it is impossible to detect ex-ante asset price bubbles, but it is possible to 
detect anecdotes of asset price bubble-type behaviour. In the same way that 
central banks focus on pricing power anecdotes and credit developments to 
gain an edge over core inflation developments, central banks should focus 
on asset market anecdotes to gain an edge over asset-price behaviour. As 
asset prices react differently in different countries to similar monetary and 
credit conditions, policies will then be adapted accordingly. But interest 
rates are a very crude instrument to deal with asset markets, and thus a 
three-pronged approach to policy is needed: a combination of mild leaning 
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tightening. This is the only way that the curse of the domestic Phillips 
curve can be overcome and dangerous financial excesses can be avoided.  
Figure 4.6 Housing prices and the current account 
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In fact, this does not necessarily mean that asset price inflation must 
be avoided at all costs. As countries adopt different policy frameworks, 
their fundamental asset values – which reflect the expected discounted cash 
flow – will differ. If a growing external imbalance is predicated on 
fundamentally stronger domestic asset prices, then the imbalance is not 
necessarily a problem. With asset-related wealth becoming an ever-
increasing component of disposable income, caution should be taken not to 
overreact to them. There is thus the need to focus on anecdotal behaviour 
to assess whether asset prices are out of balance or not.  
 
 
 80 | 
 
 
5.  Mind the Principle of Mean 
Reversion 
With real rates at historical lows and current account imbalances at record 
highs due to the forces described above, we believe that we are 
approaching the phase when these variables will return to their historical 
mean. How mean reversion will occur is clearly the key question to answer. 
Conventional wisdom focuses on exchange rate changes and fiscal policy as 
the key channels for current account adjustments. Asian central banks’ 
behaviour is also viewed as a key factor for interest rate adjustment. In our 
view, however, current account adjustment is likely to be driven by real 
interest rate adjustment, and the latter is likely to be determined by a shift 
in patterns of industrialised countries’ investment and emerging markets’ 
savings. 
We briefly run through the conventional arguments. The extent of 
exchange rate adjustment required to bring the US current account deficit 
to a more sustainable level was recently estimated by Obstfeld & Rogoff 
(2004) to require an additional 20-40% trade-weighted depreciation of the 
dollar from its end-2004 level. The main effect of the dollar depreciation 
would be a rise of the price of tradable goods and services relative to non-
tradables in the US, and a rise in the price of non-tradables relative to 
tradables in foreign countries. However, with many economies outside the 
US exhibiting only moderate degrees of flexibility, such large relative price 
changes, if not spread over a long period of time, would lead to severe 
economic frictions and substantial output losses. In the event, lower foreign 
income could depress imports by more than relative price changes would 
stimulate them. Hence, unless the process stretches over a very long period 
of time, US dollar depreciation alone would be unable to restore the US 
current account balance to a sustainable level. 
What about US fiscal policy? Another popular argument – transferred 
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national savings and hence reduce the US savings-investment balance and 
accompanying current account imbalances. However, while US fiscal 
deficit reduction may be important for the sustainability of US government 
finances, a recent paper published by the US Federal Reserve raises doubts 
about its effect on the external balance. According to Erceg et al. (2005), a 
drop in the fiscal deficit of one percentage point of GDP would induce the 
trade deficit to shrink by less than 0.2 percentage point of GDP. Applying 
this relationship to the current account suggests that the US government 
balance would have to shift from a deficit of 4.5% of GDP in 2004 to a 
surplus of 10.5% to reduce the US current account deficit from some 6% of 
GDP in 2004 to 3% in the future. This is obviously unrealistic. 
Interest rate adjustment is also viewed as dependent on Asian central 
banks’ continued willingness to accumulate US dollars and reinvest them 
in the US bond market.14 As long as this recycling of Asian current account 
surpluses into US fixed income markets continues, bond yields can remain 
at a lower level than that warranted by economic fundamentals. In our 
view, however, while this is certainly an important part of the story, it does 
not explain it fully. First, the build-up of national savings in emerging 
markets has occurred earlier than the decline in interest rates and on a 
broader scale than only in the Asian context. It reflects a combination of 
factors that we highlighted earlier, including strict fiscal policies, high 
commodity prices and competitive exchange rates. Second, the current 
record low global real interest rate also reflected the bust of investment in 
industrialised countries. Moreover, there are limits to the willingness of 
Asian countries to accumulate assets in a depreciating currency, and of the 
US’ ability to accumulate liabilities. At some point, creditor countries will 
feel that they possess enough foreign assets or, at a minimum, will slow the 
speed of foreign asset accumulation. Furthermore, the ability of central 
banks to contain appreciation pressures is increasingly being constrained 
by inflationary pressure and overheating (e.g. China and Russia). When 
that point is reached, current account imbalances will shrink from present 
levels. 
But what mechanism other than changes in exchange rates, fiscal 
policy or Asian intervention policy could initiate the adjustment in real 
interest rates and current account balances? In our view, it is most likely 
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sustained investment growth in industrialised countries coupled with an 
easing in emerging markets’ savings surplus that will raise global real 
interest rates. Higher real interest rates, especially when they happen first 
and foremost in the current account deficit countries, especially, but not 
only the US, would raise savings and dampen investment in these 
countries. As a result, current account deficits would narrow to a level that 
can be sustained for a given real interest rate differential. In the event, 
global real interest rates would rise, but more so in countries with a current 
account deficit than those with a surplus, and current account imbalances 
would shrink in line with real interest rate differentials. Exchange rate 
changes and fiscal policy adjustment would contribute to the adjustment, 
but would not be the main driver. 
Alternatively, adjustment could occur much more rapidly if asset 
prices – especially US real estate prices – collapsed. The immediate effect of 
a drop in US housing prices would be a plunge in consumption. This 
would, in turn, bring the stock market down along with investment. As the 
US economy would fall into a recession, the US dollar would drop. The 
exchange rate shock resulting from this drop would bring down growth in 
other countries, and the world would tumble into recession. As US 
domestic demand would have to fall by much more than foreign demand – 
and the latter would remain inherently weak – the world economic 
downturn could be vicious and deep until conditions are restored that 
allowed current account balances to be sustained again. In this 
environment, all but the safest assets would heavily lose in value, and the 
ageing population in industrialised countries, now stripped of their paper 
wealth, would see their pension provisions crumble. 
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6.  Conclusions 
In this report we have argued: 
i)  However one looks at it, the US current account deficit is a serious 
and unsustainable imbalance, under-reported by official statistics. 
ii)  This imbalance has been created by a combination of rising savings 
surpluses in emerging markets, boosted in part by depressed 
exchange rates and exacerbated in the more recent past by the jump 
in oil prices, and a surge in world liquidity. The latter is the likely 
cause of the current low level of interest rates. 
iii)  US monetary policy has been a key supplier of world liquidity and 
may have contributed to the economy’s external deficit by aiming for 
a trend GDP growth rate that is inconsistent with external 
equilibrium. 
iv)  The principle of mean reversion will reassert itself and bring external 
balances and asset valuations back to more sustainable levels. 
A key question that remains to be addressed is how adjustment is 
likely to occur. 
At present, the risk of a disruptive adjustment in the near future 
seems fairly low. First, emerging market countries may regard their non-
traded goods sector as too underdeveloped to assume the role of growth 
engine presently held by the traded goods sector. For them, accepting a 
significant currency appreciation may seem tantamount to killing off this 
engine. Hence, they will try to prolong the status quo. Second, the sclerotic 
euro area economy may not allow the reallocation from the traded to the 
non-traded goods sector required for dollar depreciation to have the 
desired effect on external imbalances. European economic policies may 
therefore also be geared to support the status quo. Third, the present US 
Federal Reserve leadership does not seem very likely to take account of the 
need to restore external equilibrium in the conduct of its monetary policy. 
Also, fiscal retrenchment would not help if monetary policy would offset 84 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
any negative demand effects to keep GDP growth at its elevated level 
inconsistent with external equilibrium. All this suggests that policy will do 
nothing to promote external adjustment. 
What about financial markets? Clearly, the US dollar is in a long-term 
bear market. Markets seem reluctant, however, to push for the huge 
depreciation that academic studies have argued is necessary to restore 
external balance. Perhaps financial markets feel that exchange rate changes 
are unable to do the trick and hence are unlikely to assume the levels 
predicted by the academics. At the same time, there are no signs that asset 
markets are fostering adjustment. Bond and equity prices are reacting only 
mildly to the slow ‘withdrawal of monetary stimulus’ engineered by the 
Fed. The US real estate market, however, is starting to signal the beginning 
of a stabilisation process. How this process unfolds will be key to the health 
of the world economy. Perhaps the timing is optimal: as the EU and 
Japanese economies pick up strength, the world could undergo a smooth 
rebalancing whereby the US housing market slows down and with it the 
US consumer, being replaced by global investment and by EU and Japanese 
domestic demand that restores regional savings and investment imbalances 
to sustainable levels.  
However, if we were only witnessing another false start, imbalance 
and mis-pricings would grow further until they have reached a level that 
triggers an endogenous implosion of the bubbles. The longer the status quo 
persists, the more likely disorderly adjustment becomes. The disorderly 
adjustment scenario could thus move from unlikely in the near-term to 
very likely in the long-term. Unless adjustment starts soon, economic 
policy-makers, financial market participants and ordinary citizens capable 
of looking beyond the near-term future better batten down the hatches and 
prepare for the perfect economic storm. | 85  
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